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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Although Julie Matlin liked the shoes she saw on Zappos.com, she 
ultimately left the site without purchasing them.1  However, it was not the 
last time she would see that pair of shoes.2  For the next several days, the 
shoes followed Ms. Matlin to numerous other websites.3  “It was as if 
Zappos had unleashed a persistent salesmen who wouldn’t take no for an 
answer.”4  Understandably, Ms. Matlin found this “online stalking” 
                                                
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2012, George Mason University School of Law; Editor-in-Chief, 
George Mason Law Review, 2011-2012; B.A., Religious Studies, The College of William 
& Mary, 2005. The author would like to thank Cyrus Daftary, Kendal Smith, and 
Matthew McGuire for their invaluable assistance with this article, as well as Adam Fett 
for his unfailing patience and support. 
 
1 Miguel Helft & Tanzina Vega, Retargeting Ads Follow Surfers to Other Sites, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/technology/30adstalk.html. 
 
2 See id. 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 Id. 
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disturbing, but she was more troubled when ads for her online dieting 
service started following her as well.5  She stated, “They are still following 
me around, and it makes me feel fat.”6 
 
[2] The ads that followed Ms. Matlin around the Internet are a form of 
online behavioral advertising called retargeting.7  Online behavioral 
advertising refers to the collection, use, and distribution of data about 
consumers’ online activities in order to place advertisements that 
correspond to each consumer’s interests.8  Retargeting, however, merely 
connects advertisers with past website visitors to entice those visitors to 
complete their online transactions or purchases.9  Though retargeting is 
not as invasive as traditional methods of behavioral advertising, it is often 
more disconcerting to consumers because it is more obvious.10  
 
                                                
5 See id. 
 
6 Helft & Vega, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
7 See id.; Isaac Scarborough, Behavioral Retargeting 101, IMEDIACONNECTION (July 7, 
2006), http://www.imediaconnection.com/content/10276.asp. 
 
8 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE 
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2 (2009) [hereinafter FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf; Richard 
Raysman & Peter Brown, Developments in Online Behavioral Advertising, LAW.COM, 
June 8, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202460986288&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.  
 
9See Scarborough, supra note 7. 
 
10 See Helft & Vega, supra note 1 (“As [behavioral] tracking gets more and more crass 
and obvious, consumers will rightfully become more concerned about it.” (quoting 
Michael Learmonth, The Pants That Stalked Me on the Web, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 2, 
2010, http://adage.com/digitalnext/post?articleid=145204) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Retargeting relies on the placement of a cookie on a user’s computer; thus, “if 
a user refuses or deletes cookies, they simply won't be exposed to retargeted ads.”  Hollis 
Thomases, Retargeting Gains Traction, Part 2, CLICKZ (May 9, 2006), 
http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/1696600/retargeting-gains-traction-part.  
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[3] For more than a decade, consumers and privacy advocates have 
sought to increase consumer privacy protections online through lawsuits11 
and calls for regulation.12  Many argue it is still too early for legislation.13  
However, the recent introduction of multiple privacy bills in the 
legislature displays a congressional belief that the online advertising 
industry is now ripe for formal regulation.14  
                                                
11 Most litigation involving online behavioral advertising has been brought under Title I 
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006) 
(“Wiretap Act”), Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2701-2711 (2006) (“Stored Communications Act”), and the Computer Fraud & Abuse 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”).  To date, most of these actions have been unsuccessful.  
See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500, 510-11 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing a lawsuit because website operators authorized DoubleClick 
to collect data about consumers who viewed their websites).  
 
12 For example, many consumer groups support the creation of a Do-Not-Track list 
similar to the Do-Not-Call registry, which would allow consumers to choose whether to 
let advertisers collect information about their online activities.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL 
ADVERTISING—CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER PAMELA JONES HARBOUR 5 
n.11 (2009) [hereinafter HARBOUR CONCURRENCE], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadharbour.pdf.  However, a Do-Not-Track 
list would differ from the Do-Not-Call registry in one key respect: “consumers who sign 
up for the [Do Not Call] registry are able to avoid . . . all telemarketing calls at home.”  
Wendy Davis, Without Legislation, FTC’s Do-Not-Track System Lacks Mandate, THE 
DAILY ONLINE EXAMINER (Nov. 10, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/ 
publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=139324 [hereinafter Davis, Do-Not-
Track Lacks Mandate].  By contrast, a Do-Not-Track list would not prevent advertisers 
from sending ads to individual consumers online; instead, it would only stop behavioral 
advertisers from “trailing people online and delivering ads based on users’ [w]eb 
history[ies].”  Davis, Do-Not-Track Lacks Mandate, supra. 
 
13 See, e.g., HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that regulation of 
behavioral advertising is “not prudent at this time.”); see also Robert Todd Graham 
Collins, Note, The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection Technology: Why the 
Next Wave in Online Advertising Shouldn’t Rock the Self-Regulatory Boat, 44 GA. L. 
REV. 545, 551 (2010) (“[A] knee-jerk reaction instituting new . . . online information 
privacy legislation would be misguided given the essential features of the Internet and the 
likely future of online advertising.”). 
 
14 See The BEST PRACTICES Act, and the Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft: 
Hearing on H.R. 5777 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of 
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing on 
H.R. 5777] (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & 
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[4] In 2010, Representatives Rick Boucher and Cliff Stearns released a 
discussion draft of privacy legislation (“Boucher-Stearns Privacy 
Discussion Draft” or “the Draft”).15  The Draft proposed to regulate the 
collection and use of consumer information, both on and offline.16  Shortly 
thereafter, Representative Bobby Rush introduced a bill, entitled the 
“Building Effective Strategies To Promote Responsibility Accountability 
Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards 
Act” or “BEST PRACTICES Act,” which had a similar purpose.17  
Though these bills were certainly not the first efforts to provide additional 
legal protection to consumers regarding the collection and use of their 
personal data online, they are a recent display of the series of efforts by 
Congress to ensure that privacy legislation is enacted in the near future.18 
 
[5] Considering this proposed legislation in light of the Self-
Regulatory Guidelines for Online Behavioral Advertising issued by the 
                                                
Commerce) (describing the need for privacy legislation that will “provide consumers 
with more control over their personal information and foster more responsible data 
collection practices by companies.”); Press Release, Cong. Rep. Bobby L. Rush, 
Subcommittee Chairman Bobby L. Rush Fights for[ ]Consumer Privacy and Prot. of Pers. 
Info. Introduces the BEST PRACTICES ACT of 2010 (July 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.house.gov/list/press/il01_rush/pr_100719_best_practices_act.shtml; see also 
Learmonth, supra note 10 (stating that retargeting reflects the online advertising 
industry’s lack of concern about privacy legislation).  
 
15 Press Release, Cong. Rep. Cliff Stearns, Stearns, Boucher Release Discussion Draft of 
Privacy Legislation (May 4, 2010), available at http://stearns.house.gov/News/ 
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=183894. 
 
16 See Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___ § 2(4), 111th Cong. (as published by H. 
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft), 
available at http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__draft.pdf 
(stating the bill’s goal is “[t]o require notice to and consent of an individual prior to the 
collection and disclosure of certain personal information relating to that individual”). 
 
17 See The BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. 
on Energy & Commerce, July 19, 2010). 
 
18 See, e.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. (as 
reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 22, 2009).  
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Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)19 and recent FTC enforcement 
actions,20 this Article argues that the advertising industry’s reaction to the 
proposed legislation has already expanded the FTC’s ability to use its 
enforcement authority.  In fact, the threat of legislation is already changing 
the way online advertisers do business.21  More specifically, the online 
advertising industry has established new compliance and education 
programs, which will provide more transparency and control to consumers 
about online behavioral advertising.22  
 
[6] Consequently, despite promises that recently-introduced privacy 
bills will provide additional protection to consumers, these bills will likely 
do nothing more than maintain the status quo.  This Article demonstrates 
that the self-regulatory actions (or reactions) of the online advertising 
industry bring online behavioral advertising within the FTC’s authority to 
attack “deceptive practices” under § 5 of the FTC Act.23  Thus, the FTC’s 
ability to protect consumer privacy online through enforcement actions 
against online advertisers makes the proposed legislation unnecessary, and 
ultimately too premature to result in the meaningful privacy protections 
they seek to provide.  
 
[7] Part II of this Article describes consumers’ attitudes toward online 
privacy, and provides background on online behavioral advertising, 
including what it is, how it works, and how companies obtain consent to 
collect consumers’ data.  Part III evaluates the FTC’s enforcement 
authority and its current framework of self-regulation.  In addition, this 
Part analyzes two reports released by the FTC and Department of 
Commerce (“Commerce”), which offer new frameworks for increasing 
                                                
19 See infra Part III.B (describing the FTC’s Self-Regulatory Principles for Online 
Behavioral Advertising). 
 
20 See infra Parts III.A.1, II.A.2 (outlining two recent FTC enforcement actions against 
online service providers). 
 
21 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the changes in the advertising industry’s standard 
practices in light of recent legislative action by Congress). 
 
22 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the advertising industry’s reaction to proposed privacy 
legislation). 
 
23 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
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consumer privacy.  Finally, Part IV examines the proposed privacy 
legislation and the online advertising industry’s response, ultimately 
concluding that the industry’s response to the potential legislation expands 
the FTC’s ability to bring enforcement actions against online behavioral 
advertisers and renders the proposed legislation virtually meaningless.  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
[8] Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren were the first to articulate a 
common law right to privacy.24  They argued that “the right to be let 
alone” was necessary to protect individuals from invasions of privacy that 
resulted from new technologies.25  More than a century later, their concern 
is still valid.  The proliferation of the Internet has brought with it many 
new legal challenges, and one need only look to the popular press to find 
that behavioral advertising and online consumer privacy are chief among 
them.26  
 
A.  Consumer Attitudes About Online Privacy 
 
[9] Despite the media attention devoted to the issue of online privacy, 
some argue that society no longer recognizes an individual’s right to 
privacy.27  Notably, Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, believes that 
privacy, particularly among young adults, is “no longer a social norm” 
                                                
24 See Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 193 (1890). 
 
25 See id. at 193-96 (“Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of 
new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of 
society.”). In fact, Brandeis and Warren wrote their article based on a concern that the 
rise of newspapers and the invention of “instantaneous photographs” (e.g., Polaroids) 
would compromise individuals’ rights to keep aspects of their lives private. See id. at 
195-96. 
 
26 See, e.g., What They Know Series, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/public/page/ 
what-they-know-digital-privacy.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 
27 See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Jan. 11, 2010, 9:58 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/ 
2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy. 
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because “[p]eople have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more 
information [of] different kinds, but more openly and with more people.”28  
However, recent empirical studies suggest that this characterization of 
consumer attitudes about online privacy is inaccurate.29  
 
[10] For example, in April 2010, the University of California Berkeley 
and University of Pennsylvania jointly released the results of an empirical 
study, in which they found that young adults in the United States are as 
concerned about online privacy as older adults.30  The real disparity 
between young adults and their older counterparts was that younger 
consumers believed, incorrectly, that the law provides a strong degree of 
protection for their privacy both on and offline.31  Similarly, a Zogby poll 
showed that most teens understand that search engines and social networks 
track their online activity, and demonstrated that they, like most adults, 
wanted more control over the collection of their personal information.32 
 
[11] Despite the public’s desire for more control over their personal 
data, it is often argued that people should not be concerned about privacy 
unless they have something to hide.33  Scholars describe this “nothing to 
                                                
28 Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Although social media raises different privacy 
concerns than behavioral targeting, when companies use social media to collect 
information about consumers’ online activity, they should abide by the same  
self-regulatory principles as traditional online advertisers.  See Melissa Landau Steinman 
& Mikhia Hawkins, When Marketing Through Social Media, Legal Risks Can Go Viral, 
22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. no. 8, 2010 at 1, 7; infra Part III.B. 
 
29 Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It 
Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 20 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished 
research study), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1589864; Austin Carr, Teens Want More Privacy Online Too, FASTCOMPANY.COM, Oct. 
7, 2010, http://www.fastcompany.com/1693718/teens-want-more-privacy-controls-poll. 
 
30 Hoofnagle et al., supra note 29, at 3. 
 
31 Id. at 4, 17-19. 
 
32 See Carr, supra note 29. 
 
33 Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 746-47 (2007). 
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hide argument” as an “all-too-common refrain” and the “most common 
retort against privacy advocates.”34  Moreover, this view fails to recognize 
that “real” problems result from a widespread perception that individuals 
have no right to be free from intrusion by business and government 
entities.35  As Professor Daniel J. Solove argues, harms that result from a 
lack of privacy “need not be physical or emotional” and “can occur by 
chilling socially beneficial behavior (for example, free speech and 
association) . . . .”36  Similarly, Professor Julie Cohen argues that the First 
Amendment includes an implicit “right to read anonymously” on the 
Internet.37  However, although these concerns about privacy are valid and 
publicly supported,38 they must be balanced against the broad First 
Amendment protections for commercial speech (i.e., advertising),39 
particularly when applied in the context of the Internet and other new 
technologies. 
 
B.  What is Behavioral Advertising and How Does It Work? 
 
[12] Behavioral advertising is the collection of data regarding consumer 
activity online, which allows a marketer to focus advertisements on each 
                                                
34 Id. at 747 (quoting Bruce Schneier, Commentary, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED 
(May 18, 2006), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/ 
2006/05/70886; Geoffrey R. Stone, Editorial, Freedom and Public Responsibility, CHI. 
TRIB., May 21, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-05-21/news/0605210386_ 
1_phone-records-nsa-freedoms). 
 
35 See Solove, supra note 33, at 764. 
 
36 Id. at 758. 
 
37 Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright 
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 982, 1003-15 (1996) (“[R]eading is 
so intimately connected with speech and freedom of thought that the First Amendment 
should be understood to guarantee such a right.”). 
 
38 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
 
39 See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495 (1996) 
(“Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history.  Even in colonial 
days, the public relied on ‘commercial speech’ for vital information about the market.”). 
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customer’s personal interests.40  This practice uses technology to increase 
the value of each marketing impression by “plac[ing] the right ad before 
the right person at the right time.”41  Moreover, the tailored advertisements 
that consumers receive because of behavioral advertising are the “quid pro 
quo” of free services they have access to online.42 
 
[13] There are two common forms of behavioral advertising.43  The first 
type, contextual or first-party marketing, occurs when an advertiser itself 
uses information about the particular website a consumer is viewing to 
determine what type of ad to display.44  Contextual advertising typically 
does not require the collection or retention of customer data.45  For 
example, if a consumer views an article about Fashion Week on a news 
website, an advertisement for a high-end clothing store might appear next 
to the story she is reading.  While the FTC does not actively support this 
form of advertising, it is generally regarded as less invasive than the 
alternative.46  
 
                                                
40 See FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 2; Raysman & Brown, 
supra note 8. 
 
41 Peter Brown, Behavioral Marketing, PRACTISING L. INST., Apr.-May 2010, available at 
1001 PLI/Pat 227, 229 (Westlaw). 
 
42 See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE 
RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 194 (2005).  John Battelle 
describes data collection about consumers’ online activity as a “Database of Intentions,” 
which includes “the aggregate results of every search ever entered, every result list ever 
tendered, and every path taken as a result.”  Id. at 6.  
 
43 Susan E. Gindin, Perfect Storm for Behavioral Advertising: How the Confluence of 
Four Events in 2009 May Hasten Legislation (and What this Means for Companies 
Which Use Behavioral Advertising), ISAACSON ROSENBAUM P.C., 1 (Nov. 2009),  
[hereinafter Gindin, Perfect Storm], available at http://ir-law.com/files/3166_Gindin_ 
BehavAdvertising_.pdf. 
 
44 FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at iii. 
 
45 Id. 
 
46 Id.; Gindin, Perfect Storm, supra note 43, at 1. 
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[14] The second form of behavioral advertising involves placement of a 
“cookie” on the consumer’s computer.47  A cookie is a program that, when 
placed on a consumer’s hard drive, collects information about the user, 
including usernames, search terms, and passwords.48  “Cookies are, by 
design . . . largely invisible to consumers and encrypted to be 
unintelligible to any user wanting to know what the cookies are saying 
about him or her.”49  As a result, consumers often are unaware that 
advertisers are tracking their online activities.50  Moreover, cookies are 
more invasive than contextual advertising, which tracks only consumers’ 
action on a particular website, because cookies monitor consumers’ 
movements across multiple websites within an ad network and record 
information they type into search boxes and online registration forms.51 
 
[15] There are two classes of cookies: browser-based and Flash 
cookies.52  Consumers can easily remove browser-based cookies from 
their computer’s hard drive by clearing their online browsing history or 
deleting cookies through a browser tool.53  Unlike browser-based cookies, 
Flash cookies are a more “persistent” form of behavioral tracking; 
                                                
47 FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 2. 
 
48 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001); see also In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(“Cookies are widely used on the internet by reputable websites to promote convenience 
and customization.”). 
 
49 Richard M. Marsh, Jr., Note, Legislation for Effective Self-Regulation: A New 
Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy on the Internet, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 543, 546 (2009). 
 
50 See id. 
 
51 See Brown, supra note 41, at 232. 
 
52 See Robert D. Forbes, Recent Lawsuits Challenge Use of Flash Cookies to Track 
Online Behavior, PROSKAUER PRIVACY L.BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010, 10:36 AM), 
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2010/09/articles/behavioral-marketing/recent-lawsuits-
challenge-use-of-flash-cookies-to-track-online-behavior/. 
 
53 See Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 1-2 (Aug. 10, 2009) (Working 
Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446862. 
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uncontrolled by a browser, Flash cookies are more difficult for consumers 
to delete if they wish to prevent companies from using them to collect 
behavioral data.54  In fact, a recent study found: 
 
[The] top 100 websites are using Flash cookies to 
‘respawn,’ or recreate deleted HTTP cookies.  This means 
that privacy-sensitive consumers who “toss” their HTTP 
cookies to prevent tracking or remain anonymous are still 
being uniquely identified online by advertising companies.  
[In addition, f]ew websites disclose their use of Flash in 
privacy policies, and many companies using Flash are 
privacy certified by TRUSTe.55 
For these reasons, Flash cookies ignite greater concern among consumers 
and privacy advocates, and have been at the heart of several class-action 
lawsuits.56 
 
[16] In addition, scholars also distinguish between “passive” and 
“active” collection of consumer data.57  In the case of active data 
collection, the consumer chooses to share his or her personal information 
with the advertiser – typically in response to some kind of incentive.58   By 
contrast, passive collection typically occurs when the advertiser places a 
cookie on the consumer’s computer.59  Spyware and adware represent two 
methods of passive data collection related to behavioral advertising.60  
                                                
54 Id. at 1. 
 
55 Id. at 2.  TRUSTe is a for-profit entity that monitors privacy policies on various 
websites to determine if they are adequate.  See infra Part IV.B (discussing TRUSTe’s 
business model and its compliance program for online behavioral advertisers). 
 
56 See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Godoy v. Quantcast Corp., No. CV10-7662-RGK (JCG), 
2010 WL 4236367 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2010)  (“‘Flash cookies’ … are often used in place 
of or as a back-up for browser cookies . . . [and] have been used to recreate the browser 
cookie if it is deleted by the internet user.”); Complaint, La Court v. Specific Media, Inc., 
No. SACV10-01256, 2010 WL 3581775 (C.D. Cal. Aug.18, 2010). 
 
57 Raysman & Brown, supra note 8. 
 
58 Id. 
 
59 Id. 
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[17] Spyware is a form of software that, when installed on a consumer’s 
computer, “collects and reports in-depth information about [an] end-
user.”61  On the other hand, adware does not involve the installation of 
software on a consumer’s hard drive.62  Instead, adware is software that 
tracks a consumer’s online activity and causes pop-up advertisements to 
appear on the consumer’s screen only after the consumer views a specific 
website.63  
 
[18] The foregoing methods of behavioral targeting are designed to help 
advertisers provide the consumer with tailored advertisements.64  This 
collection of data about Internet users is important to advertisers because it 
increases the value of each ad impression and improves the “click-through 
rate”65 – ultimately, increasing the advertisers’ overall revenue.66  
                                                
 
60 See Daniel B. Garrie et al., Regulating Spyware: Challenges and Solutions, 13 J. 
INTERNET L. 3, 3-4 (2010); Heather Osborn Ng, Targeting Bad Behavior: Why Federal 
Regulators Must Treat Online Behavioral Marketing as Spyware, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 369, 373-75 (2009). 
 
61 Garrie et al., supra note 60, at 3. 
 
62 C.f. Denise A. Golumbaski, Comment, Spyware Phones Home: Should the FTC 
Answer the Call for Regulation?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1171, 1178 (2005) (stating that 
adware has several legitimate uses and poses less of a threat to consumers). 
 
63 See id. 
 
64 See Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, Chairman Leibowitz’s Disconnect on Privacy 
Regulation & the Future of News, THE PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND.  (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2010/ps6.1-Leibowitz-disconnect-on-privacy-and-
advertising.html. 
 
65 The “click-through rate” is a metric used to determine how many times a web user is 
diverted from the site on which an advertisement is displayed to the advertiser’s website. 
See Stacey L. Dogan, Trademark Remedies and Online Intermediaries, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 467, 478 (2010).  It is measured by dividing the total number of clicks an 
ad receives by the number of times the ad is shown.  See Peter T. Tschanz, A 
Constitutional Right to Deceive?: The First Amendment Implications of Regulating Pay 
per Click, 2010 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 92201, *7 n.56 (2010) (quoting Animesh 
Animesh et al., Competing “Creatively” in Online Markets: Evidence from Sponsored 
Search 6 (Univ. of Md. Robert H. Smith Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. RHS-06-064, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1032199.  
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[19] Frequently, however, consumers do not expressly consent to the 
collection of their personal information.67  For example, in the context of 
traditional behavioral advertising, including the placement of cookies on 
consumers’ computers, website operators include provisions about these 
practices in their privacy policies and terms of use.68  Operators typically 
link to these documents from the initial landing page.69  However, it is 
also widely believed that consumers do not read these policies, because 
either they are uninterested or feel the documents are written in legalese 
and, thus, are incomprehensible.70  
 
[20] Nonetheless, even if consumers do not read online license 
agreements, privacy policies, or terms of use, they could be bound by their 
terms.71  For example, in the case of spyware, a consumer downloads 
software onto his or her computer, but often can do so only after expressly 
consenting to the software provider’s license agreement (typically referred 
                                                
66 See Pamela Jones Harbor, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks before FTC 
Exploring Privacy Roundtable 2 (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
speeches/harbour/091207privacyroundtable.pdf.  
67 See id. 
 
68 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 13, at 564-66 (describing Google’s privacy policy and its 
presumption of consent regarding “cookie-based data collection”). 
 
69 See generally Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They 
Are Wrapped Up to Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 202 (2007). 
 
70 See Thierer & Szoka, supra note 64, at 1 (stating the “‘literature is clear’ that few 
people read [online] privacy policies”); see also Carr, supra note 29 (“Meanwhile, 45% 
of teens said they do read [websites’] terms and conditions-- but does anyone actually 
believe nearly half of all 15- to18-year-olds are scanning pages of online legalese?”).  
 
71 See M. Angela Buenaventura, Teaching a Man to Fish: Why National Legislation 
Anchored in Notice and Consent Provisions Is the Most Effective Solution to the Spyware 
Problem, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14-15 (2006) (noting that courts often construe 
clickwrap agreements as binding “whether or not meaningful consent was actually 
present, and whether or not the user even saw the terms [of the contract] to begin with.”).  
But cf. Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 528 n.29 (2003) 
(stating that unlike clickwrap agreements, browsewrap agreements involve no actual 
consent; therefore, “no court to actually consider the enforceability of browsewrap 
licenses under contract law has found them enforceable.”).  
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to as a “clickwrap agreement”).72 One federal judge jokingly described 
consumers’ assent to clickwrap agreements in the following way: 
 
Has this happened to you? You plunk down a pretty penny 
for the latest and greatest software, speed back to your 
computer . . . click on “install” and, after scrolling past a 
license agreement which would take at least fifteen minutes 
to read, find yourself staring at the following dialog box: “I 
agree.”  Do you click the box?  You probably do not agree 
in your heart of hearts, but you click anyway, not about to 
let some pesky legalese delay the moment for which you’ve 
been waiting.  Is that “clickwrap” license agreement 
enforceable?  Yes . . . .73 
 
Accordingly, although a consumer may never actually read the terms of a 
clickwrap agreement before clicking “I Agree,” courts generally uphold 
these agreements as enforceable contracts.74  However, companies have 
had less success arguing that when they include a link to their privacy 
policies and terms of use on their home page, those legal documents (i.e., 
browsewrap agreements) constitute enforceable contracts with consumers 
who use their website.75  “Unlike a clickwrap agreement, a browsewrap 
                                                
72 See infra Part III.A.2 (describing a clickwrap agreement Sears required consumers to 
consent to before allowing them to download its software program).  
73 I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass. 
2002). 
 
74 See id. at 338 (holding a clickwrap agreement to be an enforceable contract); Forrest v. 
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002) (upholding a forum 
selection clause contained in a clickwrap agreement). 
 
75 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding 
a browsewrap agreement unenforceable because there was insufficient notice of its 
terms); Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 937 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating 
that for a browsewrap agreement to be enforceable, “the website user must have had 
actual or constructive knowledge of the site's terms and conditions, and have manifested 
assent to them.”).  But see Kimberley Rose Goldberg, Note, Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (“P3P”): Finding Consumer Assent to Electronic Privacy Policies, 14 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 255, 270-71 & n.89 (2003) (stating that 
courts might enforce browsewrap agreements if consumers continue browsing a website 
after they view that website’s home page).  
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agreement ‘does not require the user to manifest assent to the terms and 
conditions expressly . . . [a] party instead gives his assent simply by using 
the website.’”76  
 
[21] Nonetheless, as Part III describes, the enforceability of an online 
agreement may not necessarily prevent the FTC from bringing an 
enforcement action against an online advertiser.77  In the past, to avoid 
facing an FTC enforcement action, an online advertiser only needed to 
disclose the extent to which it collected and used data about consumers’ 
online activities – provided that the company abided by the representations 
in its online agreements.78  But, recently, the FTC brought an enforcement 
action against Sears for data collection practices it did disclose in its 
online privacy policy because the agency believed the privacy policy was 
misleading and led consumers to believe that they would know the extent 
to which Sears was tracking them online when, in fact, they did not.79  
 
 
 
III.  THE FTC’S ROLE: SELF-REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT 
 
A.  The FTC’s Authority to Attack Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
 
                                                
76 Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting 
Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *4 
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007)), aff'd, 380 F. App'x. 22 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 
77 See infra Part III.A. 
 
78 J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Some Reflections on the Future of 
the Internet: Net Neutrality, Online Behavioral Advertising, and Health Information 
Technology at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Telecommunications & E-Commerce 
Committee Fall Meeting 8 (Oct. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/091026chamber.pdf (“I’m personally not sure I would 
conclude that behavioral tracking that collects nonsensitive information is necessarily 
deceptive or unfair within the meaning of Section 5 [of the FTC Act], even if a particular 
consumer might find such practices disturbing or invasive.”). 
 
79 See In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., No. 082-3099, 2009 WL 2979770 (F.T.C.), at 
*1 (Aug. 31, 2009); infra Part III.A.2. 
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[22] The FTC and more specifically, its Bureau of Consumer Protection 
(“BCP”), acts as the primary enforcer for matters involving online 
consumer privacy.80  In fact, the FTC recently established a new office, 
the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, which aims to protect 
online consumer privacy, ensure information security, and combat identity 
theft.81  The FTC’s authority to attack improper conduct related to online 
consumer privacy exists under Section 5 of the FTC Act.82  This statute 
authorizes the FTC to protect consumers by prohibiting any “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” as well as “[u]nfair 
methods of competition.”83  For the first thirty years after the enactment of 
the FTC Act, the FTC failed to distinguish between “unfair” and 
“deceptive” practices when bringing enforcement actions.84  However, in 
1964, the FTC articulated a test for unfairness in its Cigarette Rule 
Statement of Basis and Purpose and, thereby, created two distinct 
categories of enforcement authority: unfairness authority and the authority 
to attack deceptive practices.85  
 
[23] Unlike its authority to attack deceptive practices, the FTC’s 
unfairness authority is no longer widely utilized.86  In a 2003 speech, 
former Director of the FTC’s BCP Howard Beales suggested that the 
FTC’s resistance to using its unfairness authority stemmed from a period 
                                                
80 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 72-73 (2004); Collins, supra note 13, at 571-73. 
 
81 Division of Privacy & Identity Protection, FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/bcppip.shtm (last updated Oct. 23, 2007). 
 
82 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006). 
 
83 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); Howard J. Beales, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its 
Rise, Fall, and Resurrection (May 30, 2003), available at 2003 WL 21501809 (F.T.C.), 
at *1.  
 
84 Beales, supra note 83.  
 
85 See id. (citing Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation 
to the Health Hazards of Smoking, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 28 Fed. Reg. 8355 
(1964)). 
 
86 See id. at *1, *4-5. 
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in the 1970s during which the FTC executed a broad and overreaching 
plan to ban all advertising aimed at children on grounds that it was 
“immoral, unscrupulous, and unethical.”87  In response to this and similar 
actions, members of the popular press began referring to the FTC as, 
“[The] [N]ational [N]anny.”88  The FTC’s actions also garnered 
disapproval from members of Congress.89  As a result, Congress enacted 
legislation that prohibited the FTC from utilizing “unfairness” to restrict 
advertising and did not reauthorize the FTC to use its unfairness authority 
for enforcement actions until approximately fifteen years later.90  In 
addition, when Congress eventually reauthorized the FTC’s unfairness 
authority in 1994, it set forth a three-part test for unfairness that focused 
on consumer injury.91  
 
[24] Therefore, today, for the FTC to use its enforcement authority to 
attack a trade practice based on unfairness, the injury to consumers must 
be: “(1) substantial, (2) without offsetting benefits, and (3) one that 
consumers cannot reasonably avoid.”92  To fulfill the first element, the 
injury must be real and considerable, even when weighed against 
offsetting benefits.93  Generally, substantial injury constitutes economic 
harm or threats to public health and safety, but emotional distress typically 
                                                
87 Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing how Former Chairman Michael 
Pertschuk also stated in his remarks that the FTC’s unfairness authority was so broad that 
the agency could utilize it to punish polluters and regulate the employment of illegal 
aliens, among other things). 
 
88 See, e.g., Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22. 
 
89 See Beales, supra note 83, at *2. 
 
90 Id.; see Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 
Stat. 374. 
 
91 See Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, 108 
Stat. 1691; Beales, supra note 83, at *5.  Today, the unfairness test is codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006). 
 
92 Beales, supra note 83, at *5; see 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 
93 Beales, supra note 83, at *6. 
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does not satisfy the standard.94  The second part of the unfairness test 
requires that any harm or injury to consumers be weighed against any 
benefit consumers receive because of the allegedly unfair practice.95  For 
example, in the context of online behavioral advertising, the collection of 
consumer data is arguably not an “unfair trade practice” because 
consumers receive access to free online content in exchange for data about 
their online activity.96  Finally, “the reasonable avoidance prong limits 
unfairness actions to those where the Commission seeks ‘to halt some 
form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an 
obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decision-making.’”97  Although 
the FTC does not currently utilize its unfairness authority often, it can be a 
powerful tool to attack unfair business practices online, like Internet 
scams.98 
 
                                                
94 Id. 
 
95 Id.  This element is important in the context of online behavioral advertising because 
consumers receive “free” content in exchange for the collection of their personal data.  
See HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12, at 1. 
 
96 See J. Thomas Rosch, supra note 78, at 13.  In the Sears action, infra Part III.A.2, 
Sears paid consumers $10.00 in exchange for permission to collect data about the 
consumer’s online activity.  Lesley Fair, Someone to Watch Over Me?, BCP BUS. CTR., 
http://business.ftc.gov/documents/someone-watch-over-me (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).  
Thus, the FTC brought its enforcement action against Sears under its authority to attack 
deceptive practices, rather than its unfairness authority. See 15 U.S.C. § 45; In re Sears 
Holdings Mgmt. Corp., No. 082-3099, 2009 WL 2979770, at *4 (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009).  
But see Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? 
Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2009). 
 
97 Beales, supra note 83, at *6 (quoting Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford & 
Hon. John Danforth, Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., U.S. Senate, Comm’n 
Statement of Policy on the Scope of Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction (Dec. 17, 1980), 
reprinted in In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1984 WL 565290, at *95 (F.T.C. 
Dec. 21, 1984)). 
 
98 See Beales, supra note 83, at *7-13; FTC v. Zuccarini, No. CIV.A. 01-CV-4854, 2002 
WL 1378421, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2002) (attacking online “mousetrapping,” i.e., 
programming websites to take control of consumer computers and forcing consumers to 
view numerous pop-up advertisements). 
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[25] The FTC’s authority to prohibit deceptive acts is much more 
straightforward.  In its 1983 Statement of Deception, the agency 
articulated three elements that must be present for the FTC to bring an 
enforcement action under its authority to attack deceptive practices.99  A 
deceptive trade practice exists when: (1) there is a representation or 
omission; (2) that is likely to mislead reasonable consumers; and (3) the 
representation or omission is material.100  
 
[26] Either express or implied claims may fulfill the first element, but 
for implied claims the FTC examines extrinsic evidence and other facts 
like the nature of the transaction and the location of the language within 
the document.101  The FTC evaluates such statements from the perspective 
of a “reasonable consumer,” and when a product targets a specific 
audience, the FTC also investigates the effect on members of that 
consumer group.102  Finally, “[a] ‘material’ misrepresentation or practice 
is one which is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct 
regarding a product.  In other words, it is information that is important to 
consumers.”103  The FTC presumes that express claims are material 
because an advertiser would not logically include information in its 
marketing if it did not want the claim to affect consumer perception about 
                                                
99 See Letter from James C. Miller III to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in 
In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 1984 WL 565319, at *45 (F.T.C. Mar. 23 
1984) [hereinafter FTC Statement on Deception]. 
 
100 Id. 
 
101 See id. at *46; see also In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 1981 WL 
389401, at *192 (F.T.C. Sept. 9, 1981) (evaluating the advertisements at issue “in their 
entirety” to determine the existence of an implied claim), aff’d, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 
1982); In re Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1489-90 (1975) (examining an 
implied claim through the location of language within a document), aff’d, 562 F.2d 749 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 
102 See FTC Statement on Deception, supra note 99, at *46 n.20 (“An interpretation may 
be reasonable even though it is not shared by a majority of consumers . . . or by 
particularly sophisticated consumers.”). 
 
103 Id. at *49. 
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the relevant product or service.104  Moreover, most representations will 
fulfill this element because the FTC also classifies information as material 
if “it concerns the purpose, safety, efficacy, or cost of [a] product or 
service” or “if it concerns durability, performance, warranties or 
quality.”105  
 
[27] Enforcement actions against providers of Internet products or 
services have typically been brought under the FTC’s authority to attack 
deceptive practices.106  To date, the FTC has brought only one 
enforcement action specifically related to online behavioral advertising.107  
Because of this, two recent actions involving deceptive practices online, In 
re Gateway Learning Corp.108 and In re Sears Holdings Management 
Corp.,109 are particularly relevant to the analysis of how the FTC might 
attack the collection of data regarding consumers’ online activities going 
forward.   
 
 
 
                                                
104 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commission of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
567-68 (1980) (“In the absence of factors that would distort the decision to advertise, we 
may assume that the willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief 
that consumers are interested in the advertising.”). 
 
105 FTC Statement on Deception, supra note 99, at *49 (footnotes omitted).  
 
106 See Rosch, supra note 78, at 9. 
 
107 In re Chitika, Inc., No. 102-3087, 2011 WL 914035, at *1-3 (F.T.C. March 14, 2011); 
see also Ng, supra note 60, at 391; Rosch, supra note 78, at 12-13 (explaining that 
presumably, it is difficult for the FTC to bring enforcement actions against online 
behavioral advertisers because (1) the agency cannot bring an enforcement action for a 
deceptive practice if advertisers fully disclose their data collection practices in online 
privacy policies or a website’s terms of use; and (2) the FTC is unable to fulfill second 
prong of the unfairness test because although the collection of data may “harm” 
consumers, they receive an off-setting benefit because they receive free access to online 
content, like newspapers and magazines).  
 
108 In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 443-44, 467 (2004). 
 
109 In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., No. 082-3099, 2009 WL 2979770, at *1, *5 
(F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009). 
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1.  FTC Enforcement Action Against Gateway Learning Corporation 
 
[28] Beginning in 2000, Gateway Learning Corporation, the provider of 
“Hooked on Phonics” products, marketed its products online at the 
following website: http://www.hop.com.110  The privacy policy on 
Gateway’s website declared: “We do not sell, rent or loan any personally 
identifiable information regarding our consumers with any third party 
unless we receive customer’s explicit consent.”111  Moreover, the policy 
stated that Gateway would notify consumers of any changes to their 
privacy policy and, at that time, would offer consumers the opportunity to 
“opt-out” of Gateway’s data collection practices.112  Nonetheless, in 2003, 
Gateway began renting consumers’ personal information to third-party 
advertisers for direct mailing and telemarketing purposes.113  
Subsequently, the company altered its privacy policy “to say that ‘from 
time to time’ Gateway Learning would provide consumers’ personal 
information to ‘reputable companies’ whose products or services 
consumers might find of interest . . . .”114  
 
[29] Shortly thereafter, the FTC filed an enforcement action in which it 
alleged that by failing to notify consumers about the retroactive 
application of its altered privacy policy, Gateway engaged in both unfair 
and deceptive trade practices.115  Because Gateway failed to notify its 
existing customers about the change to their privacy policy, it prevented 
consumers from deciding whether to allow Gateway to provide third-party 
marketers with their personal information and, thus, engaged in an unfair 
                                                
110 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Gateway Learning Settles FTC Privacy Charges 
(Jul. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/gateway.shtm. 
 
111 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).  
 
112 Id. 
 
113 See id. 
 
114 Id. 
 
115 See In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. at 449-50. 
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practice in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act.116  Similarly, the FTC alleged 
that Gateway also engaged in deceptive practices because Gateway 
represented to consumers in its privacy policy that it would not sell or rent 
customer data and, subsequently, rented the information to third-party 
advertisers without obtaining the express consent of consumers.117 
 
[30] The FTC entered a Consent Order (i.e., a settlement agreement 
between the agency and the offending party) in Gateway on September 10, 
2004.118  The agreement prohibited Gateway from making 
misrepresentations about how it would use data collected about 
consumers’ online activities.119  In addition, the Consent Order required 
Gateway to obtain “express affirmative (‘opt-in’) consent from 
consumers” when it made “material changes to its [online] privacy 
polic[ies]” and prohibited Gateway from making retroactive changes to its 
data collection practices.120  
 
2.  FTC Enforcement Action Against Sears Holdings 
Management Corporation 
 
[31] More recently, in 2009, the FTC filed an action against Sears under 
§ 5 of the FTC Act for deceptive practices related to its “My SHC 
Community” program.121  The FTC alleged that Sears failed to notify 
customers that when they installed Sears’ software tracking application, 
the software collected information about all of the consumers’ online and 
even offline activities (including web browsing histories, purchases, e-
mail messages, and even secure data like online checking account 
information), and transmitted the customers’ data to Sears.122  According 
                                                
116 See id. at 449. 
 
117 See id. at 449-50. 
 
118 Id. at 443. 
 
119 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 110. 
 
120 Id. 
 
121 See In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *1; Gindin, supra note 96, at 1. 
 
122 See Gindin, supra note 96, at 1. 
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to the FTC, Sears invited customers to their websites – 
http://www.sears.com and http://www.kmart.com – and asked them to 
participate in the “My SHC Community” program.123  Sears offered to pay 
customers $10.00 and, in exchange, customers would download the “My 
SHC Community” software to their computers, which would track their 
“online browsing.”124  In its marketing e-mails, Sears stated: 
 
My SHC Community is a dynamic and highly interactive 
online community.  It’s a place where your voice is heard 
and your opinion matters, and what you want and need 
counts!  As a member of My SHC Community, you’ll 
partner directly with the retail industry.  You’ll participate 
in exciting, engaging and on-going interactions – always on 
your terms and always by your choice.125 
 
Sears’s marketing e-mails reiterated that although participants downloaded 
software that would “confidentially track [customers’] online browsing,” 
the collection would always be “on [their own] terms and always by [their] 
choice.”126  Once consumers elected to participate in the program, Sears 
directed them to a landing page that displayed the same content included 
in its marketing e-mails.127  Finally, consumers completed a registration 
form that presented a Privacy Statement and User License Agreement 
(“PSULA”).128  Consumers were required to click on a box, stating that 
they had read and agreed to the terms of the PSULA, to complete their 
registration.129   Sears included additional details in the PSULA about the 
                                                
 
123 Fair, supra note 95. 
 
124 Id. 
 
125 In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *2 (emphasis added). 
 
126 Id. 
 
127 See id. at *3. 
 
128 Id. at *3-4.  
 
129 Id. at *4.  
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extent to which they would track consumers’ activities.130  Even though 
Sears required consumers to agree to the terms of the PSULA before 
downloading the “My SHC Community” software, the FTC argued that 
the marketing e-mails (and information on various landing pages) made 
material misrepresentations to consumers and, thus, constituted a 
deceptive practice.131  In essence, the FTC alleged that Sears could not 
reasonably expect consumers to read the PSULA and, therefore, should 
have provided “clear and prominent” notice to consumers about the 
information they planned to collect on the landing pages consumers 
viewed prior to downloading the software.132  
 
[32] Eventually, Sears settled with the FTC, agreeing to destroy the data 
collected and clearly identifying any future attempts to track consumers’ 
online activities.133  The current Director of the FTC’s BCP, David 
Vladeck, described Sears as “‘an absolutely classic deception case’” that 
“hinged on full disclosure and notice.”134  In his view, “Sears enticed 
people into participating in this program by offering a few dollars but not 
really telling them what they were doing with the data.”135  In so doing, 
                                                
130 See In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *3-4; see also Exhibit D, In re Sears Holding 
Mgmt. Corp., 2009 WL 2979770 (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009) (No. C-4264). 
 
131 See In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *4. 
 
132 See id. at *6-7.  The FTC’s action did not challenge the enforceability of the PSULA – 
instead it argued that Sears placed deceptive language in its marketing e-mails and 
websites (i.e., Sears implied that consumers would retain control over the collection of 
their information when, in fact, the “My SHC Community” software ran in the 
background of their computers, and consumers who installed the application often had no 
knowledge that their personal information was collected).  See id. at *4; Gindin, supra 
note 96, at 2. 
 
133 See In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *6-7; Edmund Lee, FTC’s Top Consumer Cop 
Likes Personalization of Web, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 27, 2010, 
http://adage.com/article?article_id=146064. 
 
134 Lee, supra note 133. 
 
135 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Sears belittled consumers and demonstrated a genuine lack of concern for 
online consumer privacy.136  
 
B.  FTC Guidelines for Self-Regulation in Online Behavioral Advertising 
 
[33] After almost a decade of exploring the impact of Internet 
advertising on online consumer privacy through discussions with privacy 
advocates, members of the online advertising industry, and legislators, the 
FTC released its Guidelines for Self-Regulation in Online Behavioral 
Advertising (“FTC Guidelines”) in February 2009.137  Although the FTC 
recognized that individuals had legitimate concerns about the collection 
and storage of data related to their online activities, the agency also stated 
that consumers received a real benefit from this practice, in the form of 
free access to online content.138  In addition, the agency noted that many 
consumers valued the tailored advertising they received because of 
behavioral tracking.139  For example, Director Vladeck admitted that he 
“sort of like[s] the personalization” of advertisements he receives on the 
Internet.140  Therefore, by implementing a voluntary program of self-
regulation, the FTC sought to “address practices that raise genuine privacy 
concerns without interfering with practices – or stifling innovation – 
where privacy concerns are minimal.”141  In addition, the FTC Guidelines 
“appl[ied] broadly to companies engaged in online behavioral advertising, 
defined as tracking consumers’ online activities in order to deliver 
advertising that is targeted to the individual consumers’ interests.”142 
 
                                                
136 See id. 
 
137 See generally FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8. 
 
138 Id. at 1. 
 
139 Id. 
 
140 Lee, supra note 133 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 
141 FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 1. 
 
142 Id. at 20. 
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[34] Four major concepts govern the FTC Guidelines: (1) control and 
transparency; (2) security and limited data retention; (3) affirmative 
express consent for material changes to existing privacy promises; and (4) 
affirmative express consent to (or prohibition against) use sensitive data 
for behavioral advertising.143  The first principle instructs companies that 
collect data regarding consumers’ online activity to “provide meaningful 
disclosures to consumers” about the information collected and an ability to 
opt-out of the practice.144  The second principle encourages companies 
that employ behavioral advertising to “provide reasonable data security 
measures” that will prevent inadvertent disclosure of sensitive data and to 
keep such data on file only as long as necessary to achieve their business 
objectives.145  The third principle directs companies to obtain consumers’ 
express consent when they make material changes to their privacy policies 
concerning the data collected.146  Finally, the fourth principle requires 
companies to “obtain [consumers’] affirmative express consent before 
they use sensitive data – for example, data about children, health, or 
finances – for behavioral advertising.”147  
 
[35] Although the FTC Guidelines provided broad principles to move 
the industry toward an environment more protective of online consumer 
privacy, the agency recognized that this was just a “step in an ongoing 
process.”148  Moreover, the FTC urged the industry to take ownership of 
the self-regulatory model by requiring that all industry members comply 
                                                
143 Id. at 11-12. 
 
144 Id. at 11.  The FTC described “meaningful disclosure” in the following way: 
“[W]ebsites where data is collected for behavioral advertising should provide [1] 
prominent notice to consumers about such practices and [2] should also offer consumers 
the ability to choose whether to allow such collection and use.”  Id. at 30. 
 
145 Id. at 11.  The report does not specifically define “reasonable data security measures,” 
however, it does note that these measures could include (1) ensuring anonymity of all the 
data collected; or (2) requiring companies to destroy data after a certain length of time, 
like six months.  See id. at 37-38. 
 
146 FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
 
147 Id. at 12. 
 
148 Id. at 47. 
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with the FTC Guidelines and work to solve the privacy problems 
behavioral advertising presents.149  As a result, in July 2009, several trade 
associations150 representing various parts of the advertising industry 
developed a similar set of self-regulatory guidelines (“Industry 
Guidelines”).151  
 
[36] Like the FTC Guidelines, the Industry Guidelines set forth seven 
core principles:  (1) transparency; (2) consumer control; (3) data security; 
(4) notification of material changes in privacy practices; (5) enhanced 
protection of sensitive data; (6) consumer education; and (7) 
accountability.152  In fact, five of the seven principles, the Transparency 
and Consumer Control Principles, the Data Security Principle, the 
Material Changes Principle, and the Sensitive Data Principle, 
corresponded directly to the governing principles in the FTC 
Guidelines.153  In addition, the Industry Guidelines’ two other principles, 
the Education and Accountability Principles corresponded to important 
additional commentary in the FTC Guidelines.154  For example, the 
Education Principle directed companies to educate consumers about the 
                                                
149 See id. at 47-48. 
 
150 The trade associations that developed the online advertising industry’s self-regulatory 
guidelines were the American Association of Advertising Agencies, Association of 
National Advertisers, the Council of Better Business Bureaus, the Direct Marketing 
Association, and the Interactive Advertising Bureau.  See Interactive Advertising Bureau 
et al., Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising, ABOUTADS.INFO 
(July 2009), http://aboutads.info/resource/download/seven-principles-07-01-09.pdf 
[hereinafter Industry Guidelines]. 
 
151 See id. at 1. 
 
152 Id. at 2-4. 
 
153 Id. at 1. 
 
154 See id. at 1-4; see also Hunton & Williams LLP, Live Coverage from Jerusalem: 
Vladeck Provides Overview of Upcoming FTC Report, PRIVACY & INFORMATION 
SECURITY LAW BLOG (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/ 
2010/10/articles/events/live-coverage-from-jerusalem-vladeck-provides-overview-of-
upcoming-ftc-report/#more [hereinafter Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem]. 
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benefits and concerns associated with online behavioral advertising.155  
Similarly, the Accountability Principle encouraged members of the 
industry to “develop and implement policies and programs to further 
adherence to [the Industry Guidelines],” and stated that these programs 
should “have mechanisms by which they [could] police entities engaged in 
online behavioral advertising and help bring [non-compliant] entities into 
compliance.”156  
 
[37] Despite the FTC’s efforts to adopt a regulatory model that would 
be flexible in response to innovation, some argued that the FTC did not go 
far enough.157  For example, FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch argued 
that the best way to protect online consumer privacy was for the United 
States to adopt a regulatory framework like the European Union’s 
overarching approach to privacy instead of the existing sectoral approach 
to privacy legislation.158  
 
[38] Nonetheless, FTC Commissioner (now Chairman) Jon Leibowitz 
issued a Concurring Statement to the FTC Guidelines, which stated that 
the agency’s endorsement of self-regulation was not a “regulatory 
                                                
155 See Industry Guidelines, supra note 149, at 2. 
 
156 Id. at 4. 
 
157 See, e.g., HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12, at 1 (stating the FTC Guidelines 
“while commendable, focus[] too narrowly” and she would prefer a “more 
comprehensive approach to privacy.”). 
 
158 See Rosch, supra note 78, at 8 (acknowledging that Europeans view the American 
approach to online behavioral advertising as “a cavalier attitude toward . . . ‘spying’”).  
The European Union, unlike the United States, has data privacy rules that apply broadly 
across all industries.  See DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, 
COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC 
POLICY FRAMEWORK 11-12 (2010) [hereinafter COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY 
FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov//reports/2010/IPTF_Privacy_ 
GreenPaper_12162010.pdf.  By contrast, the United States “protects personal data 
through a sectoral framework . . . . that uses voluntary enforceable codes of conduct . . . 
together with strong sectoral privacy laws covering certain information categories such as 
health, finance, education, and information about children.”  Id. at 11-12 (citations 
omitted).  
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retreat.”159  Instead, he stated that the industry should view the guidelines 
as its “last clear chance to show that self-regulation can – and will – 
effectively protect consumers’ privacy in a dynamic online 
marketplace.”160  Therefore, the FTC hoped that the threat of regulation – 
should voluntary self-regulation not be successful in ensuring greater 
protection of online consumer privacy – would “scare” companies into 
taking self-regulation seriously.161 
 
C.  New Frameworks for Online Consumer Privacy:  
Recent FTC and Department of Commerce Reports 
 
1.  Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change:  
A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers  
(Preliminary FTC Staff Report) 
[39] Approximately two years after the release of its guidelines for  
self-regulation in online behavioral advertising, the FTC published a 
preliminary staff report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid 
Change (the “Report”), which broadly addresses consumer privacy both 
on and offline.162  Based on a series of roundtable discussions the agency 
held with members of the industry and Congress, the Report encourages 
companies to provide real-time notification of behavioral tracking and 
includes recommendations for providing “clear and meaningful ways for 
                                                
159 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING – CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JON 
LEIBOWITZ 1 (2009) [hereinafter LEIBOWITZ CONCURRENCE], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadleibowitz.pdf. 
 
160 Id. 
 
161 See id. 
 
162 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS i (2010) 
[hereinafter FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.  
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consumer to have more control and choice over information collected 
about them online.”163  
 
[40] At the 2010 International Conference of Data Protection and 
Privacy Commissioners, Director Vladeck spoke about the Report and 
emphasized that it highlights the need for consumer education so that 
consumers are fully aware of what behavioral advertising is, when it is 
happening, and how they can control their information.164  In addition, the 
Report concludes that neither of the existing privacy models – the “notice-
and-choice” and the “harm-based” models – have kept up with the rapidly 
evolving technologies that businesses use to collect and manipulate 
consumer data.165  
 
[41] First, the notice-and-choice model sought to “encourage[] 
companies to develop privacy notices describing their [data] collection 
and use practices to consumers, so that consumers [could] make informed 
choices . . . .”166  However, this approach became problematic because, 
over time, privacy notices grew more complex and difficult for consumers 
to understand.167  In addition, very few companies gave consumers any 
opportunity to the control the collection and use of their personal 
information.168  As a result, the notice-and-choice model “place[d] too 
                                                
163 Juliana Gruenwald, FTC Privacy Report May be Released by Late October, 
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Sept. 29, 2010, 12:08 PM), http://techdailydose.national 
journal.com/2010/09/ftc-privacy-report-may-be-rele.php (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at ii. 
 
164 See Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154. 
 
165 See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at iii (“[T]he notice-and-
choice model . . . has led to long, incomprehensible privacy policies that consumers 
typically do not read,” while the harm-based model fails to compensate privacy-related 
injuries, like damage to one’s reputation or “fear of being monitored.”). 
 
166 Id. 
 
167 See id. at 19. 
 
168 Id. 
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much burden on consumers to read and understand privacy notices and 
make privacy choices.”169 
 
[42] Second, the harm-based model aimed to “protect[] consumers from 
specific harms” like “physical security, economic injury, and unwanted 
intrusions into their daily lives.”170  However, this model is often maligned 
for its failure to take into account reputational injury and other  
privacy-related harms.171  Therefore, because “[c]onsumers may feel 
harmed when their personal information . . . is collected, used, or shared 
without their knowledge or consent or in a manner that is contrary to their 
expectations,”172 the FTC recognized that “there is a pressing need to 
reexamine the conception of ‘harm’ in U.S. law . . . .”173 
 
[43] Based on those conclusions, the Report proposes a new framework 
centered on three key principles.174  The first principle, Privacy by Design, 
contends that online advertisers and all businesses that collect consumer 
data should do more to protect consumer privacy “on the front end,” by 
incorporating additional privacy protections into their day-to-day business 
operations.175  The second principle, Simplified Choice, states that 
companies should ensure that their data collection and retention practices 
align with consumers’ expectations, while offering consumers a real, clear 
                                                
169 Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154. 
 
170 FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at iii. 
 
171 Id. 
 
172 Id. at 20 (citing Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 877, 881 (2003)). 
 
173 Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.  
 
174 See generally FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162. 
 
175 Id. at 41, 44-52; Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.  
Privacy by Design is an approach adopted by the Information and Privacy Commissioner 
of Ontario, Ann Cavoukian, Ph.D., which promotes that organizations adopt a proactive 
role in developing privacy protections.  See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 162, at v n.3 (citing PRIVACY BY DESIGN, http://www.privacybydesign.ca (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2011)). 
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choice to opt-out, at the exact time they plan to collect consumers’ 
personal information.176  However, the FTC stated that companies need 
not provide consumers an opportunity to opt-out of data collection for 
“commonly accepted practices.”177  Commonly accepted data collection 
practices include the fulfillment of product orders, “internal operations” 
(i.e., customer service surveys), “fraud prevention,” compliance with law 
enforcement, and, most controversially, “first-party marketing.”178  
 
[44] The third principle, Greater Transparency, concludes that 
“[c]ompanies should increase the transparency of their data practices.”179  
Specifically, businesses should strive to provide consumers with short, 
clear, and easily understandable privacy notices.180  In addition, the Report 
also states that companies should give consumers the ability to access 
information collected about them, so they can correct or modify inaccurate 
data.181  Although the Report encourages companies to simplify their 
privacy policies dramatically, it acknowledges the challenges companies 
might face in implementing this principle, particularly in the “mobile 
                                                
176 See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at 41; Hunton & Williams 
LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154. 
 
177 FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note162, at 41, 52-69. 
 
178 Id. at 53-54; see supra Part II.B (describing the difference between first-party 
marketing and cookie-based behavioral advertising).  First-party marketing can be 
controversial because companies might share consumer data with their affiliates, when 
consumers are unaware of the extent of a company’s network of affiliates; however, the 
FTC explicitly stated that “[i]f a company shares data with a third party other than a 
service provider acting on the company’s behalf – including a business affiliate unless the 
affiliate relationship is clear to consumers through common branding or similar means – 
the company’s practices would not be considered first-party marketing.”  FTC PROPOSED 
PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at 55.  
 
179 Id. at 41; Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.  
 
180 FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at 41-42; Hunton & Williams 
LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.  
 
181 See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at 74-75. 
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context where, because of the small size of the device, a privacy notice 
can be spread out over 100 separate screens.”182  
 
[45] Finally, the Report also advocates for the creation of a  
Do-Not-Track list, akin to the Do-Not-Call registry, which established a 
limit on telemarketing calls made to residences.183  Nonetheless, the FTC 
can only recommend, rather than mandate, a Do-Not-Track list unless 
Congress provides the agency with additional rule-making authority.184  
Privacy advocates and members of the advertising industry also debate 
whether it would even be technologically feasible to establish such a 
mechanism.185  However, immediately following the FTC’s release of the 
Report, Microsoft announced that Internet Explorer 9, which it plans to 
release shortly, incorporates “Tracking Protection,” a feature allowing 
“consumers to determine the types of third-parties that can track their 
[w]eb behavior.”186 
                                                
182 Id. at 70-71. 
 
183 See id. at 66; see also HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12 at 5 n.11 (discussing 
the interest of privacy advocates in creating a Do-Not-Track List); Edward Wyatt & 
Tanzina Vega, Stage Set for Showdown on Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/business/media/10privacy.html; Wendy Davis, FTC 
Considers Do-Not-Track List, ONLINE MEDIA DAILY (July 27, 2010, 6:21 PM), 
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=132700. 
 
184 Davis, Do-Not-Track System Lacks Mandate, supra note 12 (“[T]hough the FTC is 
considering recommending such a system, the agency lacks the authority to mandate do-
not-track.  Yes, the FTC can certainly say it thinks Web companies should figure out a 
way to implement a universal do-not-track program, but can’t do much more absent 
legislation.” (emphasis added)); see also FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 162, at 66 (acknowledging that a Do-Not-Track List could be instituted by  
self-regulation, but would likely require legislation). 
 
185 See Sara Jerome, Public Interest Groups, Advertisers at Odds over Feasibility of ‘Do 
Not Track’ List, HILLICON VALLEY: THE HILL’S TECHNOLOGY BLOG (Oct. 21, 2010, 2:07 
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/125235-sides-disagree-on-
technological-ease-of-do-not-track (stating that consumer advocates “say the obstacles to 
the [Do-Not-Track] system are policy-related and not technological,” but digital 
advertisers claim the system would be difficult to implement because online tracking 
methods are constantly evolving).  
 
186 Juan Martinez, Microsoft Says Internet Explorer 9 Will Include Behavioral 
Advertising Opt-Out, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS (Dec. 8, 2010), 
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[46] Notably, in the Report, the FTC did not ask Congress for 
additional rule-making authority and did not endorse any of the privacy 
bills introduced by legislators.187  Instead, the FTC appeared to recognize 
that privacy legislation is still premature – asking stakeholders to respond 
to more than fifty questions for comment.188  This lack of clarity suggests 
that the FTC believes legislators should wait for more information before 
they move forward with privacy legislation.  
 
2.  Commercial Data Privacy and Innovation in the  
Internet Economy: A Dynamic Policy Framework  
(Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force) 
[47] The FTC is not the only administrative agency that recently 
published a report regarding the collection of consumer data online.189  In 
December 2010, the Department of Commerce, at the direction of the 
Obama Administration, released a green paper on commercial data 
privacy.190  Prior to its release, the Department of Commerce Assistant 
Secretary Lawrence Strickland stated that the green paper was not “a final 
position statement, but rather the beginning of a ‘dialogue’ that would lead 
to an official administration policy on information privacy.”191   
Nonetheless, the Department’s green paper aims to provide the 
administration with suggestions for establishing a new framework for 
Internet privacy, including recommendations for potential legislation.192  
                                                
http://www.dmnews.com/microsoft-says-internet-explorer-9-will-include-behavioral-
advertising-opt-out/article/ 192420/; see Tanzina Vega, Microsoft, Spurred by Privacy 
Concerns, Introduces Tracking Protection to its Browser, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 12/08/business/media/08soft.html;  
 
187 Cf. FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at vii-viii. 
 
188 See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at app. A. 
 
189 See Wyatt & Vega, supra note 183. 
 
190 See generally COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK supra note 158. 
 
191 Julia Angwin, Watchdog Planned for Online Privacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703848204575608970171176014.html.  
 
192 See COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at i. 
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A newly established task force headed by Cameron Kerry will endeavor to 
turn the recommendations into federal policy.193  
 
[48] Specifically, the green paper recommends the establishment of “a 
baseline privacy framework” through legislation that will “afford 
protection for consumers, and . . . clarify the U.S. approach to privacy to 
[the United States’] trading partners – all without compromising the 
current framework’s ability to accommodate new technologies.”194  
Currently, the privacy statutes in the United States reflect a sectoral 
approach to consumer privacy, which represents a legislative effort to 
tailor privacy protections to the individual industries being regulated.195  
However, according to the Department, this flexible approach has created 
“gaps” in privacy law, into which “[m]uch of the personal data traversing 
the Internet falls . . . .”196  Thus, the green paper recommends updating the 
Fair Information Practice Principles197 so that privacy protections would 
extend to data not currently covered under existing statutory 
frameworks.198  In addition, the green paper also proposes that once these 
baseline protections exist, it might not be necessary to enact additional 
                                                
193 Angwin, supra note 190; Lance Whitney, White House Wants to Beef up Internet 
Privacy Laws, CNET (Nov. 12, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-
20022650-83.html. 
 
194 COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 2-3; see also Christopher 
Wolf, Summary of Draft Department of Commerce Privacy Green Paper, HOGAN 
LOVELLS CHRONICLE OF DATA PROTECTION (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.hldataprotection.com/2010/11/articles/general/summary-of-draft-department-
of-commerce-privacy-green-paper/ [hereinafter Wolf, Summary of Privacy Green Paper]. 
 
195 See COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 11-12 (citing the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6809, 6821, 
6827, as examples of sector-specific privacy bills).  
 
196 Id. at 12. 
 
197 See infra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 
198 See COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 22. 
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legislation tailored to specific industries.199   Rather, the FTC could 
enforce voluntary industry codes of conduct through its existing authority 
under § 5 of the FTC Act.200   
 
[49] Like the FTC’s recent report, the Commerce Department’s report 
does not endorse any of the existing privacy legislation.201  Moreover, the 
Department’s green paper recognizes that, “[i]n many areas, the current 
combination of sectoral laws and general FTC Section 5 enforcement 
works well to protect the privacy of individuals.”202  And, although the 
report recommends the creation a new federal office, the Privacy Policy 
Office, to develop and implement new federal policies concerning 
commercial data privacy, it states that the FTC should remain the primary 
enforcer in matters concerning online consumer privacy.203  However, in 
those areas where the current system is not as effective, the green paper 
states that a new, dynamic approach is necessary to ensure that stronger 
privacy protections are achieved, but not at the expense of online 
innovation.204 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
199 See id. at 41-44 ( “Voluntary, enforceable codes of conduct should address emerging 
technologies and issues not covered by [the] current application of baseline [Fair 
Information Practice Principles.]”). 
 
200 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2); COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, 
at 41-44. 
 
201 COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 20-21. 
 
202 Id. at 68. 
 
203 See id. at 44-52. 
 
204 See id. at 46. 
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IV.  THE NEXT STEP IN CONSUMER PRIVACY: THE INTRODUCTION OF 
PRIVACY LEGISLATION AND  INDUSTRY EFFORTS TO PREVENT IT 
 
A.  Recently-Introduced Privacy Legislation: BEST PRACTICES  
Act and Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft 
[50] Within the last year, several members of the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce introduced online privacy legislation.205  In May 
2010, Representatives Rick Boucher and Cliff Stearns released the first of 
these bills, a discussion draft of privacy legislation that aimed to regulate 
the collection and use of consumer information by online behavioral 
advertisers and other media providers.206  Approximately two months 
later, Representative Bobby Rush introduced the BEST PRACTICES Act, 
which has a similar purpose.207  Several Senators, notably Mark Pryor, 
John Kerry, and John McCain, are working on online privacy 
legislation.208  Senator Pryor’s legislation would mandate the creation of a 
Do-Not-Track list that would allow consumers to permanently “opt-out of 
having their [w]eb activities tracked for advertising purposes,”209 while the 
                                                
205 See Hearing on H.R. 5777, supra note 14, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Henry A. 
Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce). 
 
206 See Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___, 111th Cong. (as published by H. Subcomm. 
on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft), available at 
http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__draft.pdf; see also 
Press Release, Cong. Rep. Cliff Stearns, supra note 15. 
 
207 See BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, July 19, 2010) supra note 17. 
 
208 See Press Release, Senator John Kerry, Kerry, McCain Introduce Commercial Privacy 
(Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id= 59a56001-5430-
4b6d-b476-460040de027b; Juliana Gruenwald, Measure Would Give Consumers More 
Control over Web Tracking, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Sept. 30, 2010, 2:43 PM), 
http://techdailydose.national journal.com/2010/09/measure-would-give-consumers-m.php 
[hereinafter Gruenwald, Control Over Web Tracking]; Hunton & Williams LLP, Senator 
Kerry's Senior Advisor Provides Key Insight into Forthcoming Privacy Bill, PRIVACY & 
INFORMATION SECURITY LAW BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2010/12/articles/centre-for-information-policy-
2/senator-kerrys-senior-advisor-provides-key-insight-into-forthcoming-privacy-bill/ 
[hereinafter Hunton & Williams LLP, Senior Advisor]. 
 
209 Gruenwald, Control Over Web Tracking, supra note 208. 
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privacy bill introduced by Senators Kerry and McCain seeks to establish 
the baseline privacy framework advocated by the Commerce Department’s 
recent green paper.210  Nonetheless, Congress’s purpose in enacting any 
form of online privacy legislation would likely be to “make people more 
likely to trust electronic commerce and the [I]nternet,” without stifling 
innovation in the online advertising industry.211  
 
[51] The Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft includes several 
key provisions conferring additional responsibilities on online advertising 
and additional privacy rights on individuals.212  For example, the Draft 
would require companies that collect personally identifiable information 
about consumers to display a “clear and conspicuous,” and easily 
understandable privacy policy that describes how companies collect, use, 
and disclose consumer data.213  Among other things, the Draft also 
provides that “an individual has a reasonable expectation that a company 
will not share that person’s information with unrelated third parties,” and 
requires companies to obtain express consent before sharing that 
information with third-party advertisers.214  Finally, the Draft grants the 
                                                
210 Press Release, Senator John Kerry, supra note 209; Hunton & Williams LLP, Senior 
Advisor, supra note 208; see also supra Part III.C (discussing the Commerce 
Department’s December 2010 privacy report). 
 
211 Avi Goldfarb & Catherine E. Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising 32 
(Aug. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (quoting Cecilia Kang, New Bill on the Way for 
Online Privacy, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2009, 10:10 AM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/09/new_bill_on_way_for_online_pri.htm), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1600259. 
 
212 See Press Release, Cong. Rep. Cliff Stearns, supra note 15. 
 
213 See Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___ §§ 2(5), 3(a) 111th Cong. (as published by H. 
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft), 
available at http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__ 
draft.pdf (describing the personally identifiable information included in the definition of 
“covered information”).  The bill refers to personally identifiable information, like 
names, physical addresses, social security numbers as “covered information;” however, 
notably, the definition also includes other data ordinarily referred to as non-personally 
identifiable information, such as IP addresses and user preferences.  Id. 
 
214 Press Release, Cong. Rep. Cliff Stearns, supra note 15. 
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FTC additional rule-making authority and states that a violation of the 
bill’s provisions is an unfair and deceptive act under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act.215  Nonetheless, although the Draft extends the FTC’s enforcement 
authority, it explicitly precludes a private right of action.216 
 
[52] However, in the 2010 mid-term elections, Congressman Rick 
Boucher lost his congressional seat.217  When Republicans took over the 
majority in the House of Representatives, many members of the industry 
hoped that takeover would spell the end of potential legislation regarding 
online consumer privacy and behavioral advertising.218  Yet, Republican 
legislators have made clear that privacy is a bipartisan issue.219  In fact, 
                                                
215 Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___ § 8(a)(1)-(3), 111th Cong. (as published by H. 
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft), 
available at http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__ 
draft.pdf.  
 
216 Id. § 9.  
 
217 See Hunton & Williams LLP, Key Voice on Privacy Issues Loses Congressional 
Reelection Bid While Another Joins the Senate, PRIVACY & INFORMATION SECURITY LAW 
BLOG (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2010/11/articles/online-
privacy/key-voice-on-privacy-issues-loses-congressional-reelection-bid-while-another-
joins-the-senate/; Mike Shields, Online Privacy Bill: Dead in the Water?, ADWEEK 
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.adweek.com/aw/content_display/news/politics/e3if13877 
e698a1cce2faa1baf6cc66750a; Christopher Wolf, What the US Election Results Mean for 
Privacy, HL CHRONICLE OF DATA PROTECTION (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.hldataprotection.com/2010/11/articles/general/what-the-us-election-results-
mean-for-privacy/ [hereinafter Wolf, US Election Results]. 
 
218 See Shields, supra note 217 (“The Interactive Advertising Bureau, which has spent the 
past two years rallying the online ad industry to take the regulation threat seriously, isn’t 
hiding its pleasure at [the 2010 election] results.”). 
 
219 See Press Release, Senator John Kerry, Kerry, McCain Introduce Commercial Privacy 
(Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id= 59a56001-5430-
4b6d-b476-460040de027b; see also Sara Jerome, Analysts: Privacy Bills Will Survive the 
Election Storm, HILLICON VALLEY: THE HILL’S TECHNOLOGY BLOG (Nov. 1, 2010, 1:45 
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/126829-online-privacy-to-
remain-an-issue-for-gop-or-dem-led-house (noting that Congressman Cliff Stearns has 
demonstrated a “‘serious concern about ensuring American consumers are fairly treated 
when they go online.’” (quoting Jeff Chester, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Digital Democracy)); 
Shields, supra note 217 (“Privacy appeals to both lefty progressives and Tea Partiers.” 
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Republican Congressman Joe Barton stated shortly after the 2010 
elections that he would be “‘very, very willing to legislate in [the privacy] 
area.’”220  Additionally, House Democrats remain equally committed to 
moving forward on privacy legislation.221  Representative Bobby Rush, 
author of the BEST PRACTICES Act, sought to oversee the House 
Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet.222  This 
displays his commitment to pursuing online privacy legislation actively 
and, perhaps, additional efforts he will take to garner support for the BEST 
PRACTICES ACT.223 
 
[53] Unlike the Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft, the BEST 
PRACTICES Act received outspoken support from the members of the 
online media industry.224  Recently, Intel, eBay and Microsoft voiced their 
support for the BEST PRACTICES Act, stating:  
                                                
(statement of Jeff Chester, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Digital Democracy)); Wolf, US Election 
Results, supra note 217. 
 
220 The Communicators: Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX) (C-SPAN television broadcast Nov. 6, 
2010), available at http://www.cspan.org/Events/Rep-Joe-Barton-R-TX/19686-1/; Barton 
“Very, Very Willing to Legislate,” IAPP DAILY DASHBOARD (Nov. 8, 2010), 
https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/2010_11_08_barton_very_very_willing
_to_legislate/. 
 
221 Cecilia Kang, House to Hold Do Not Track Hearing on Internet Privacy, POST TECH 
(Nov. 15, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/11/ 
the_house_subcommittee_for_com.html. 
 
222 See Tony Romm, Rush Wants to Lead Tech Panel Dems, POLITICO (Nov. 12, 2010, 
4:36 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/45053.html. 
 
223 See id. 
 
224 See Juliana Gruenweld, Three Major Tech Firms Back Rush's Privacy Bill, TECH 
DAILY DOSE (Oct. 7, 2010, 1:59 PM), http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2010/10/ 
thee-major-tech-firms-back-rus.php [hereinafter Gruenweld, Three Major Tech Firms]; 
Privacy Bills Comparison Chart, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., 1-12 (2010), 
http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/Privacy bills comparison chart_CDT_0.pdf (supplementing 
Leslie Harris’ testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection on “The BEST 
PRACTICES Act of 2010 and Other Federal Privacy Legislation”).  Contra Tony Romm, 
supra note 222 (describing the ensuing debate between both critics and supporters over 
legislation addressing the collection of consumer information on the web). 
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We support the bill’s overall framework, which is built 
upon the Fair Information Practices regime. We appreciate 
that the BEST PRACTICES Act is technology neutral and 
gives flexibility to the Federal Trade Commission to adapt 
to changes in technology . . . . The bill also strikes the 
appropriate balance by providing businesses with the 
opportunity to enter into a robust self-regulatory 
program.225 
Despite their general support for the BEST PRACTICES Act, the 
companies voiced concerns about the bill’s private right of action, which 
would likely cause “unnecessary litigation costs and uncertainty for 
businesses.”226  Therefore, they urged Representative Rush to remove that 
provision from his bill.227 
[54] In general, the BEST PRACTICES Act is more inclusive than the 
Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft.228  For example, the Draft 
                                                
225
 Gruenweld, Three Major Tech Firms, supra note 224; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm.  The Fair Information Practices are “the rights and 
responsibilities associated with the transfer and use of personal information.”  DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 657 (3d ed. 2009).  They 
include the following: (1) Collection limitation (“There must be no personal data record 
keeping systems whose very existence is secret.”); (2) Disclosure  (“There must be a way 
for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is 
used.”); (3) Secondary usage (“There must be a way for an individual to prevent 
information about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made 
available for other purposes without his consent.”); (4) Record correction (“There must 
be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about 
him.”); and (5) Security (“Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or 
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data 
for their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.”).  Id. at 
655-57 (citing DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 29-30, 41-42 (1973)). 
 
226 Gruenweld, Three Major Tech Firms, supra note 225 (citation omitted) (internal 
quotations marks omitted). 
 
227 Id. 
 
228 See generally Privacy Bills Comparison Chart, supra note 224. 
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applies only to companies that collect sensitive data directly from 
consumers, exempting businesses that utilize data collected by other 
companies.229  By contrast, the BEST PRACTICES Act applies not only 
to companies that collect consumer data online, but also to companies that 
handle the information, like data brokers.230  Additionally, the BEST 
PRACTICES Act contains a broader definition of “sensitive information,” 
and specifically includes all types of “geolocation information,” 231 which 
has been at the heart of many recent legal disputes.232  
 
[55] Another notable difference between the two bills is that the 
Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft lacks a provision requiring 
online behavioral advertisers to conduct internal audits and develop other 
accountability mechanisms.233  By contrast, the BEST PRACTICES Act 
                                                
 
229 See Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___ § 2(4), 111th Cong. (as published by H. 
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft), 
available at http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__ 
draft.pdf. 
 
230 See The BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777 § 2(3), 111th Cong. (as reported by H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, July 19, 2010); see also Privacy Bills Comparison 
Chart, supra note 225, at 1. 
 
231 See Privacy Bills Comparison Chart, supra note 225, at 2.  Compare Boucher-Stearns 
Privacy, H.R. ___ § 2(10), 111th Cong. (as published by H. Subcomm. on Commc’ns, 
Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft), available at 
http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__draft.pdf (defining 
sensitive information as one’s medical records, race or ethnicity, religious beliefs, sexual 
orientation, financial records, and precise location), with The BEST PRACTICES Act, 
H.R. 5777 § 2(8), 111th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, July 
19, 2010) (defining sensitive information as including any information about one’s 
medical history, physical or mental health, or the provision of health care, race or 
ethnicity, religious beliefs or affiliation, sexual orientation or sexual behavior, income, 
financial records, or financial status, information about an individual’s location or 
activities and relationships association with an individual’s location, biometric data like 
fingerprints or retina scans, and social security numbers). 
 
232 See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-66 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(discussing whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding 
geolocation data of their whereabouts, like GPS coordinates).  
 
233 See Privacy Bills Comparison Chart, supra note 224, at 9. 
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includes several accountability provisions.234  First, entities covered by the 
BEST PRACTICES Act must “provide a process for individuals to make 
complaints concerning the covered entity’s policies and procedures . . . 
.”235  In addition, covered entities must also conduct privacy assessments 
“prior to the implementation of commercial projects, marketing initiatives, 
business models, applications, and other products and services” if the 
entity concludes that the practice will result in the collection of data from 
more than one million consumers.236  
 
[56] The accountability provisions in the BEST PRACTICES Act are of 
particular importance because they dovetail with the industry’s efforts to 
increase accountability in online behavioral advertising through new 
compliance programs.237  Furthermore, since it appears that neither the 
Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft nor the BEST PRACTICES 
Act will receive additional consideration for the next several months, the 
success of the industry’s compliance program may directly influence the 
need and/or desire for Congress to enact formal legislation.238  At the very 
least, the success of the industry’s compliance program will determine 
                                                
234 See id. 
 
235 The BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777 § 302(a), 111th Cong. (as reported by H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, July 19, 2010). 
 
236 Id. § 302(b). 
 
237 See infra Part IV.B.  The Commerce Department also promoted accountability in it 
recent green paper, encouraging companies to conduct “privacy impact assessments 
(PIAs)” to “identify and evaluate privacy risks arising from the use of personal 
information.”  COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 34. 
 
238 See Juliana Gruenwald, Finding Common Ground, but No Agreement, TECH DAILY 
DOSE (Sept. 24, 2010, 10:21 AM) [hereinafter Gruenwald, Finding Common Ground], 
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2010/09/finding-common-ground-but-no-a.php; 
Juliana Gruenwald, Privacy Likely to Remain on Agenda in House Next Year, TECH 
DAILY DOSE (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/ 
2010/09/privacy-likely-to-remain-on-ag.php; Kashmir Hill, Future of Privacy Forum 
Founder Does Not Expect Online Privacy Bills to Pass This Year, Comment to The Not-
So Private Parts, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2010, 5:53 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/ 
kashmirhill/2010/09/15/future-of-privacy-forum-head-does-not-expect-online-privacy-
bills-to-pass-this-year/?boxes=Homepagechannels. 
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whether the legislation, if enacted, might actually change how companies 
protect consumer privacy online. 
 
B.  Industry Efforts to Enhance Self-Regulation  
of Online Behavioral Advertising 
 
[57] Although the advertising and media industries first implemented 
their Self-Regulatory Guidelines for Online Behavioral Advertising in July 
2009,239 critics argue that the self-regulatory model has not been 
effective.240  Moreover, until recently, the industry had taken no real 
action in response to the FTC’s directives to increase transparency and 
provide consumers with more control over the collection of data regarding 
their online activities.241 
 
[58] Following the introduction of the Boucher-Stearns Privacy 
Discussion Draft and the BEST PRACTICES Act, however, several 
advertising industry trade associations announced a new coalition, the 
Digital Advertising Alliance, formed to oversee a new phase in the 
industry’s self-regulatory efforts.242  As part of the new initiative, the 
                                                
239 See generally Industry Guidelines, supra note 150150, at 12-18. 
 
240 See Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary 
Codes 9-12 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-16, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrm?abstractid=1510275. 
 
241 See Robert D. Forbes, Update: Internet Advertising Groups Launch Self-Regulation 
Program, Comment to Privacy Law Blog, PROSKAUER (Oct. 5, 2010, 11:51 AM), 
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2010/10/articles/behavioral-marketing/update-internet-
advertising-groups-launch-selfregulation-program/ [hereinafter Forbes, Update]; Tanzina 
Vega, Ad Group Unveils Plan to Improve Web Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/business/media/04privacy.html [hereinafter Vega, 
Ad Group]. 
 
242 Wendy Davis, Industry Coalition Bows Self-Regulation Info Web Site, Readies New 
Trade Organization, MEDIAPOSTNEWS (Sept. 30, 2010, 7:08 PM), 
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=136831 
[hereinafter Davis, Industry Coalition].  The “Digital Advertising Alliance” is currently 
comprised of seven trade associations, including the Interactive Advertising Bureau, 
American Association of Advertising Agencies, American Advertising Federation, 
Association of National Advertisers, Better Business Bureau, Direct Marketing 
Association, and the Network Advertising Initiative.  Id. 
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Digital Advertising Alliance launched a website: 
http://www.aboutads.info.243  Among other things, the website displays the 
Industry Guidelines for self-regulation in online behavioral advertising, 
offers information to companies about how to register for the self-
regulatory compliance program, and, most importantly, educates 
consumers about what online behavioral advertising is and how they can 
control the collection of data regarding their online activity.244  
 
[59] Principally, this phase of the industry’s self-regulation efforts 
promotes the use of a universal icon, the “Power I,” that publishers and 
advertisers can place inside advertisements to inform consumers about 
when behavioral tracking is taking place.245  When consumers click on the 
icon, they “will be directed to a page explaining why they are seeing a 
particular advertisement and how to opt out of being tracked online.”246  
This use of an icon: 
 
[R]epresents a major shift in how consumers are notified 
about a company’s use of behavioral advertising. 
Historically, sites have included notice of their practices 
and consumers’ choice with respect to them solely within 
their privacy policies. With the icon, both notice and choice 
will be presented in a far more clear and conspicuous 
manner.247 
                                                
 
243 DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, http://www.aboutads.info/ (last visited May. 9, 
2011). 
 
244 See id. 
 
245 See Forbes, Update, supra note 241.  The “Power I” icons are blue triangles, similar to 
“play” buttons, with the letter placed in the center, and are expected to go live on 
websites that comply with the program’s requirements in the near future.  See Davis, 
Industry Coalition, supra note 244. 
 
246 Forbes, Update, supra note 241. 
 
247 REED FREEMAN, JR., ET AL., MORRISON & FOERSTER,  MORRISON & FOERSTER CLIENT 
ALERT: INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS LAUNCH BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING SELF 
REGULATORY PROGRAM INVOLVING ICON, 2 (2010) [hereinafter MOFO CLIENT ALERT], 
available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/101006-Behavioral-
Advertising.pdf. 
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In addition, the language on the Digital Advertising Alliance’s website is 
clearer than the traditional “legalese” included in online privacy 
policies.248  
 
[60] “The compliance program, like the self-regulatory principles, is 
part of the industry’s effort to demonstrate that no new privacy laws are 
needed.”249  Companies will instead be incentivized to maintain 
compliance with Industry Guidelines in exchange for use of the “Power I” 
icon on their website.250  In fact, before a company can include the “Power 
I” icon in advertisements it distributes or posts on its website, the coalition 
requires a third party “Approved Provider” to ensure that the entity 
complies with the self-regulatory principles in the Industry Guidelines.251  
To participate in the compliance program, companies must also pay a 
registration fee and make a commitment, which may be enforceable by the 
FTC, to comply with the Industry Guidelines.252  The Digital Advertising 
Alliance is not the only industry-generated effort to ensure compliance 
                                                
 
248 Compare Understanding Online Advertising, THE SELF REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, http://www.aboutads.info/consumers/ (last visited 
April 16, 2011), with In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 451-66, 2004 WL 
5662254, at *4 (F.T.C. Sept. 10, 2004) (containing Gateway’s online privacy policies). 
 
249 Davis, Industry Coalition, supra note 242. 
 
250 See id. 
 
251 See Advertising Option Icon Application, THE SELF REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, http://www.aboutads.info/participants/icon (last 
visited April 16, 2011) (instructing that a company must acquire the approval of an 
Approved Provider as evidence of compliance).  Better Advertising was the first 
company designated as an Approved Provider to enforce compliance with the Self-
Regulatory Principles of the Digital Advertising Alliance; see, e.g. Davis, Industry 
Coalition, supra note 241; Press Release, EVIDON, Digital Advertising Alliance 
Endorses Better Advertising as the First Approved Technology Provider for Industry 
Self-Regulatory Program (October 10, 2010), available at http://www.evidon.com/ 
releases/daa_release. 
 
252 MOFO CLIENT ALERT, supra note 247, at 3. 
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with the FTC and Industry Guidelines.253  Unlike the Digital Advertising 
Alliance’s initiative, which is a non-profit coalition of industry trade 
organizations,254 TRUSTe is a for-profit company that has also created an 
icon-based compliance program for online advertisers.255  
 
[61] TRUSTe is a company that monitors the privacy policies of 
various websites to determine if they are adequate.256  Once a privacy 
policy is certified, TRUSTe allows the website to place an icon on the 
website’s home page.257  Because of its background with privacy policies 
and compliance, TRUSTe has recently created a similar compliance 
program for the advertising industry, TRUSTed Ads.258  Like the Digital 
Advertising Alliance’s program, the TRUSTed Ads program utilizes an 
icon, which consumers can click on to access information regarding data 
collection for behavioral targeting purposes and “an easy-to-use opt-out 
option.”259  However, unlike the “Power I” icon, which will appear inside 
an advertisement,260 the TRUSTed Ads icon will appear adjacent to the 
advertisement.261  Therefore, consumers might not notice the TRUSTed 
Ads icon as easily as the “Power I” icon because, theoretically, an icon 
                                                
253 See, e.g., Tom Foremski, TRUSTe Tries to Manage the Massive Problem of Internet 
User Privacy, ZDNET BLOG (Oct. 7, 2010, 5:05 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/ 
foremski/truste-tries-to-manage-the-massive-problem-of-internet-user-privacy/1523. 
 
254 See Davis, Industry Coalition, supra note 242. 
 
255 See Foremski, supra note 253. 
 
256 Id. 
 
257 Id. 
 
258 See Press Release, TRUSTe, TRUSTe Launches TRUSTed Ads Privacy Platform 
(Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/TRUSTe-
Launches-TRUSTed-Ads-Privacy-Platform-1329164.htm. 
 
259 Id. 
 
260 See Forbes, Update, supra note 241. 
 
261 See Press Release, TRUSTe, supra note 258. 
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that is out-of-place in a regular advertisement would stand out more than 
an icon placed outside the advertisement’s border. 
 
[62] These efforts at increased self-regulation have received 
considerable support from the industry, particularly in light of its desire to 
avoid regulation.262  However, critics of self-regulation remain 
unconvinced, calling this effort “the latest version in a long series of failed 
self-regulatory efforts” and asking “the government to step in and set rules 
for the industry.”263  Despite the lack of enthusiasm among privacy 
watchdogs and regulators about the industry’s recent efforts to further the 
self-regulatory model, recent studies suggest that this program could be 
the perfect middle ground.264  First, Evidon (formerly Better Advertising), 
one of the companies enforcing compliance with the Digital Advertising 
Alliance’s program,265 released a research study examining how 
consumers interacted with advertisements containing the “Power I” icon 
and how that interaction affected their views of the brand advertised.266  
The study confirmed that consumers do, in fact, have a strong desire for 
the transparency in data collection practices and control over their 
information that the FTC and the Industry Self-Regulatory Guidelines call 
                                                
262 See Vega, Ad Group, supra note 241 (describing how members of the industry as “a 
big step forward,” but “privacy advocates say self-regulation is not enough”). 
 
263 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
264 See Scott Klass, Research: Consumers Feel Better About Brands that Give Them 
Transparency and Control over Ads, EVIDON BLOG (Nov. 10, 2010, 2:30 PM), 
http://blog.evidon.com/2010/11/10/research-consumers-feel-better-about-brands-that-
give-them-transparency-and-control-over-ads/; Tanzina Vega, Studies Find Success in 
Use of Privacy Icons, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Nov. 16, 2010, 9:00 AM) 
[hereinafter Vega, Studies], http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/studies-
find-success-in-use-of-privacy-icons/; see also John Eggerton, Brill: FTC Will Monitor 
Behavioral Ad Self-Regs, MULTICHANNEL NEWS BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010, 9:41 AM), 
http://www.multichannel.com/article/458855-Brill_FTC_Will_Monitor_Behavioral_Ad 
_Self_Regs.php. 
 
265 Scott, Better Advertising’s Assurance Platform Endorsed by Digital Advertising 
Alliance, EVIDON BLOG (Oct. 4, 2010, 11:30 AM), 
http://blog.evidon.com/2010/10/04/better-advertisings-assurance-platform-endorsed-by-
the-digital-advertising-alliance/. 
 
266 See Klass, supra note 265. 
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for.267  For example, 76 percent of consumers wanted information about 
which companies were involved in targeting advertisements they 
received.268  In addition, nearly 90 percent of respondents also wanted full 
control over their information (i.e., they “want to be able to pick and 
choose which individual companies to opt out of.”).269  
 
[63] Nonetheless, the Evidon/Better Advertising study also revealed 
that consumers responded positively to the “Power I” icon, with 67 
percent of consumers “feel[ing] better about brands when they [were] 
given more ‘control’ by those brands, including the ability to opt out” of 
having their data collected.270  Likewise, 36 percent of participants stated 
they were more likely to purchase products from brands that were 
transparent about their data collection practices.271  
 
[64] However, the highlight of the study for members of the behavioral 
advertising industry was that even if consumers viewed the “Power I” icon 
in their ads and received a clear opportunity to opt-out, the opt-out rate 
was “extremely low [at] 0.0001 percent.”272  Essentially, after learning 
about behavioral targeting associated with a given advertisement, only one 
person in every thousand consumers chose not to allow online advertisers 
to continue collecting his data.273  As a result, the survey’s coordinators 
argued that the participation in the Digital Advertising Alliance’s program 
would not hurt online advertisers; in fact, the study showed that 
                                                
267 See id; see also FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 46 (stating that 
behavioral advertisers should “provide a clear, concise, consumer-friendly, and 
prominent statement” about the types of data collected and information about how 
consumers can opt-out of having their data collected); Industry Guidelines, supra note 
150, at 2-3, 12-14. 
 
268 Klass, supra note 264. 
 
269 Id. 
 
270 Id. 
 
271 Id. 
 
272 Id. 
 
273 Klass, supra note 264. 
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“providing evidence of compliance” with the FTC and Industry Guidelines 
“can build brands and help generate [a] better ROI [return on 
investment].”274  
 
[65] Similarly, a second research study, conducted jointly by TRUSTe 
and the Publishers Clearing House, examined the effectiveness of the 
TRUSTed Ads program.275  For the study, TRUSTe placed its TRUSTed 
Ads icon near ads displayed on a Publishers Clearing House website.276  
Clicking on the icon placed near the ad redirected consumers to a website 
that explained targeted advertisements and offered consumers a means to 
learn more about the ads as well as an opportunity to opt-out of receiving 
them.277  
 
[66] First, the study revealed that people were much more likely to click 
on the TRUSTed Ads icon than they were to click on a website’s privacy 
policy.278  Second, the study also showed that “more than half of the 
people who saw the icon and clicked through” found the information 
about the targeting advertisements “helpful.”279  Finally, like the Better 
Advertising study, only a small percentage of visitors exercised the option 
to opt-out of all behavioral targeting.280  
 
[67] Although the results of these studies seem focused on garnering 
additional participation in the self-regulatory programs by members of the 
                                                
274 Id. 
 
275 Press Release, TRUSTe, supra note 258; Vega, Studies, supra note 264. 
 
276 Vega, Studies, supra note 264. 
 
277 Id. 
 
278 Id. (“The click-through rate on the icon was 2.5 percent higher than the click-through 
rate on privacy policies.”). 
 
279 Id. 
 
280 Id. (“[V]ery few visitors, 1.1 percent, chose to opt out of all advertising networks.”). 
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behavioral advertising industry,281 they also represent a clear attempt to 
demonstrate that privacy legislation is still premature.  In fact, these 
studies reflect increasing efforts by members of the behavioral advertising 
industry to show the government that the use of in-ad icons could be the 
most effective means of informing consumers about advertisers’ data 
collection practices, giving them a real opportunity to control the 
collection and use of their information without hindering innovation.282 
 
C.  The Industry’s New Self-Regulatory Programs Expand the FTC’s Role 
and Make Recently Proposed Privacy Bills Unnecessary 
[68] Though privacy advocates continue to insist that legislation is 
necessary to provide adequate protection for online consumer privacy, the 
industry’s recent efforts to improve the self-regulatory model offer the 
FTC a new opportunity to bring enforcement actions against online 
advertisers, without the aid of formal regulation.283  Currently, the FTC 
does not bring enforcement actions against online behavioral advertisers if 
they disclose the collection and use of data about consumers’ online 
activities in their privacy policies.284  Therefore, they are not engaging in a 
deceptive practice, unless they misinform or mislead customers about how 
they collect or use that information.285  In addition, it is difficult for the 
FTC to utilize its unfairness authority to attack behavioral advertising, 
because although consumers may suffer some abstract harm due to the 
collection of information about their online activity, consumers do receive 
                                                
281 See, e.g., Vega, Studies, supra note 264 (quoting TRUSTe’s President, who stated, 
“This [study] is to tell Industry, ‘Do a good job on this, because [it’s] really not going to 
hurt your business.’”). 
 
282 See generally Klass, supra note 264; Vega, Studies, supra note 264. 
 
283 See MOFO CLIENT ALERT, supra note 247, at 3 (noting that the downside of 
participating in the industry’s compliance program is that the commitment to abide by the 
Industry’s Self-Regulatory Guidelines is an enforceable agreement subject to 
enforcement under § 5 of the FTC Act); Vega, Ad Group, supra note 241. 
 
284 See note 78 and accompanying text. 
 
285 See, e.g., In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 474-75, 2004 WL 5662254 
(F.T.C.  Sept. 10, 2004). 
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an offsetting benefit – like the ability to read online newspapers without a 
paid subscription.286 
 
[69] However, by participating in either of the industry’s compliance 
programs and placing icons in or near advertisements they publish or 
distribute, companies that engage in behavioral advertising will be making 
material representations to the public that their data collection practices 
comply with the Industry (and, effectively, the FTC) Guidelines.287  
Therefore, if a company displays either the “Power I” or TRUSTed Ads 
icon and, in fact, fails to comply with the privacy principles set forth in the 
FTC and Industry Guidelines, the FTC can bring an enforcement action 
against the entity under its authority to prohibit deceptive practices.288  
 
[70] Using similar reasoning, the FTC has brought numerous 
enforcement actions against companies that have asserted compliance with 
the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement in their website’s privacy policy and, 
yet, failed to remain compliant with the program.289  “The U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor Framework provides a method for U.S. companies to transfer 
personal data outside of Europe that is consistent with the requirements of 
                                                
286 See JOHN BATTELLE, supra note 42, at 194 (describing behavioral advertising as the 
“quid pro quo” for free online services); HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12, at 1 
(acknowledging that consumers receive access to numerous, “free” online services in 
exchange for the collection of personal information); see also infra Part III.C.1. 
 
287 See MOFO CLIENT ALERT, supra note 247, at 4; see also FTC Statement on Deception, 
supra note 99, at *192 (stating that an express claim is necessarily material under the 
FTC’s deception authority because companies do not include material in advertising 
unless it is likely to affect a consumer’s choice).  
 
288 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  See generally FTC Statement on Deception, supra note 99, 
at *167-93. 
 
289 See, e.g., In re Collectify LLC, No. 092-3142, 2009 WL 3239634 (F.T.C. Oct. 6, 
2009); In re Directors Desk LLC, No. 092-3140, 2009 WL 3239632 (F.T.C. Oct. 6, 
2009); In re Expatedge Partners, LLC, No. 092-3138, 2009 WL 3239629 (F.T.C. Oct. 6, 
2009); In re Onyx Graphics, Inc., No. 092-3139, 2009 WL 3239631 (F.T.C. Oct. 6, 
2009); In re Progressive Gaitways LLC, No. 092-3141, 2009 WL 3239633 (F.T.C. Oct. 
6, 2009); In re World Innovators, Inc., No. 092-3137, 2009 WL 3239628 (F.T.C. Oct. 6, 
2009). 
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the European Union Directive on Data Protection (“Directive”).”290 The 
Directive, which became effective in 1998, is a comprehensive approach 
to privacy legislation that, ordinarily, would prevent companies from 
transferring personal data to non-European Union nations unless those 
nations met European standards for consumer privacy protection.291  
However, to ensure that U.S. companies could:  
 
[S]atisfy the EU adequacy standard for certain commercial 
transfers, the U.S. Department of Commerce . . . and the 
[European Commission] negotiated the U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor Framework, which went into effect in 2000. The 
Safe Harbor allows U.S. companies to transfer personal 
data lawfully from the EU. To join the Safe Harbor, a 
company must self-certify to Commerce that it complies 
with seven principles and related requirements that have 
been deemed to meet the EU’s adequacy standard.292 
[71] As part of the Safe Harbor program, the Department of Commerce 
maintains a website, which lists all the companies who have notified the 
agency of past or current compliance with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor 
Framework.293  “An organization’s self-certification . . . and its appearance 
on this list pursuant to the self certification, constitute a representation to 
the Department of Commerce and the public that it adheres to a privacy 
policy that meets the safe harbor framework.”294  If a company self-
                                                
290 See, e.g., In re Progressive Gaitways, 2009 WL 3239633, at *1. 
 
291 See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 
Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000); Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 
1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995 
L0046:EN:HTML;  see also U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, available at 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 11, 2011). 
 
292 In re World Innovators, 2009 WL 3239628, at *1. 
 
293 See Safe Harbor List, EXPORT.GOV, http://www.safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
 
294 Id. 
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certifies to the Department of Commerce that its privacy practices comply 
with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework, then the certification lasts for a 
twelve-month period; however, the company must re-certify its 
compliance each year to remain “current.”295  In addition, next to each 
company on the Safe Harbor List, the Department displays information 
about whether the company has a current self-certification on file with the 
agency.296 
 
[72] The FTC has authority to enforce compliance with the U.S.-EU 
Safe Harbor Framework under Section 5 of the FTC Act.297  As previously 
mentioned, the Act provides that all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce” are illegal.298  In addition, the FTC Act also 
gives the agency plenary power to bring enforcement actions against 
companies that engage in practices the Act proscribes.299  Using this 
authority, the FTC has brought numerous enforcement actions against 
companies that have engaged in “deceptive practices” by falsely asserting 
compliance with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework.300 
 
[73] For example, in 2009, the FTC filed an action against Progressive 
Gaitways, LLC for violating the FTC Act in connection with the U.S.-EU 
Safe Harbor Framework.301  Progressive sold medical equipment online 
and, as early as 2007, began representing in its websites’ privacy policies 
                                                
295 See id. 
 
296 See id. 
 
297 See 15 U.S.C. § 45; Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European 
Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000). 
 
298 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  
 
299 See id. § 45(a)(2), (b). 
 
300 See, e.g., In re Collectify LLC, No. 092-3142, 2009 WL 3239634, at *2 (F.T.C. Oct. 
6, 2009); In re Directors Desk LLC, No. 092-3140, 2009 WL 3239632, at *2 (F.T.C. Oct. 
6, 2009); In re Expatedge Partners, LLC, No. 092-3138, 2009 WL 3239629, at *2 (F.T.C. 
Oct. 6, 2009). 
 
301 See In re Progressive Gaitways LLC, No. 092-3141, 2009 WL 3239633, at *1 (F.T.C. 
Oct. 6, 2009). 
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that it participated in the Safe Harbor program.302  However, although 
Progressive filed its self-certification of compliance with the Safe Harbor 
in 2004 and re-certified in 2005, it failed to renew its self-certification in 
2006 and, thus, was listed on the Commerce Department’s Safe Harbor 
List as “not current.”303  Consequently, because Progressive made material 
representations in its online privacy policies that it actively participated in 
the Safe Harbor program, when, in fact, it did not,304 the FTC alleged that 
Progressive had engaged in a deceptive practice, in violation of the FTC 
Act.305  Eventually, the FTC and Progressive negotiated a consent decree, 
under which Progressive agreed to refrain from making similar 
misrepresentations regarding its participation in any government and/or 
third party compliance programs in the future.306  
 
[74] Like the FTC’s Safe Harbor enforcement actions, even without the 
aid of additional privacy legislation, the agency can still bring 
enforcement actions against website operators and online behavioral 
advertisers that “mislead consumers about privacy . . . by failing to honor 
their privacy polices [as in Gateway], or circumventing users’ opt-out 
preferences by, say, using Flash cookies to recreate deleted HTTP 
cookies.”307  Similarly, if a company represents through the use of  
“Power I” or TRUSTed Ads icons that they have complied with both the 
FTC and Industry Guidelines for the collection and use of data regarding 
consumers’ online activities, the FTC can bring an enforcement action 
                                                
302 See id. 
 
303 See id. at *2. 
 
304 See id. at *2-3. 
 
305 See id at *3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).  
 
306 See In re Progressive Gaitways LLC, 2009 WL 3239633, at *3-5. 
 
307 Wendy Davis, Self-Regulation Vs. Legislation: FTC, Commerce Dept. Set to Offer 
Differing Takes on Privacy, THE DAILY ONLINE EXAMINER (Nov. 12, 2010, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=139481 
[hereinafter Davis, Self-Regulation]. 
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against the entity under its authority to attack deceptive practices, if the 
company, in fact, fails to comply with the self-regulatory framework.308 
 
[75] Thus, because of the online advertising industry’s new compliance 
programs, the FTC’s enforcement authority allows the agency to ensure 
that online behavioral advertisers comply with the self-regulatory 
principles.309  As a result, the Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft, 
the BEST PRACTICES Act, and similar privacy bills, if passed, will do 
nothing more than formalize the privacy framework already in place 
through the industry’s enhanced version of self-regulation. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[76] The existing system of self-regulation allows the FTC to utilize a 
flexible approach to enforcement as new technologies and methods of 
behavioral advertising increase in popularity and create privacy 
concerns.310  In addition, the advertising industry has only recently taken 
steps to ensure that its members comply with the FTC’s self-regulatory 
model.311  Thus, even though privacy advocates argue that it took the 
industry too long to take online consumer privacy seriously, regulators 
should wait and see if the industry’s efforts are successful in creating 
widespread transparency regarding online advertisers’ data collection 
practices.  The FTC should also give the industry time to educate 
consumers, by providing clear privacy notices and showing consumers 
how they can control how data about their online activities is collected and 
used.  At best, the recently-introduced privacy bills are likely to maintain 
the status quo; but, at worst, the bills could increase litigation and 
uncertainty costs for online advertisers and, as a result, stifle innovation. 
 
[77] Therefore, the FTC should seize the opportunity the advertising 
industry’s new compliance programs present.  The agency should 
                                                
308 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); FTC Statement on Deception, supra note 99, 175-83. 
 
309 See Davis, Self-Regulation, supra note 307. 
 
310 See supra Part III.B. 
 
311 See supra Part IV.B (discussing the advertising industry’s reaction to the proposed 
legislation). 
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encourage all members of the online advertising industry to participate in 
these programs, work with the industry’s existing initiatives to educate 
consumers about online privacy, and, finally, bring additional enforcement 
actions against online behavioral advertisers using their existing power to 
combat unfair and deceptive commercial practices.  Based on recent 
industry efforts, the FTC can do all of these things now without the aid of 
additional rule-making authority or the assistance of new privacy 
legislation. 
